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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper is inspired by the ills borne out of the internet. The internet has become a 
modern day tool for criminals seeking to conceal the proceeds derived from their crime, 
hence the problematic notion of cyberlaundering. This paper journeys through the world 
of cyberlaundering by looking into the structure of the crime in great depth. It explores 
various possibilities, and tries to hatch out viable solutions to the dilemma. 
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CHAPTER 1 
MAPPING THE TERRAIN 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
The advent of the internet could be rightly deemed a miracle. The ease at which 
everyday life is run can be majorly ascribed to this specie of technology which has been 
engrained in our lives. With its rising availability, the internet is steadily becoming a 
common luxury for all.1 Be it personal or business, the internet has formed an 
indispensable tool upon which most organizations (whether public or private) are built. 
However, the wonder of the internet has yielded a new breed of vices in the society. 
Cyberlaundering is sadly one of such. The term cyberlaundering refers to how illegal 
proceeds of crime are laundered using the internet in order to make such illegal proceeds 
appear “clean.”  This very novel form of cyber crime is characterised by evasiveness. As 
it is an untrodden path, not much research has been done on it. This paper thus seeks to 
investigate the structure of this crime, with a view to finding effective regulatory and 
control mechanisms. 
At the G-7 summit on 14 July 1989 in Paris, the Financial Action Task Force 
(FATF)2 was established. The FATF issued Forty Recommendations amongst which is 
                                                            
1 In 2009, it was reported that about 70% of all households in the United Kingdom had internet at home 
compared to a miserly 54% in 2006. See 
<http://www.statistics.gov.uk/CCI/nugget.asp?ID=8&Pos=1&ColRank=1&Rank=192> 
[accessed on the 15th of March, 2010]. 
2 The FATF is an inter-governmental body with the purpose of combating money laundering and terrorist 
financing. See paragraph 4.3.2.1. 
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the appeal to expand the coverage of the Anti-Money Laundering (AML) regime to 
lawyers, auditors, accountants and other legal structures that are sometimes used to 
disguise the beneficial owners of assets.3 This fact is premised on the reality that the 
AML regime had previously been the task of economists and the like. As an impetus for 
undertaking this research, it becomes imperative within the global pandemonium caused 
by the advent of cyberlaundering to explore the measures that can be taken against 
cyberlaundering from both a practical and a legal standpoint. 
 
1.2 THE PROBLEM OF CYBERLAUNDERING: SIGNIFICANCE OF 
RESEARCH 
This paper is inspired by the ugly reality of cyberlaundering facing the modern 
world. While most societal ills result from very glaring incidents, cyberlaundering - the 
inconceivable specie of money laundering, is apparently doing more damage than one 
can physically envisage. The answer to the frequently asked question – “just how much 
money is annually laundered in the world today?” appears to be a riddle of some sought. 
Till date no one knows precisely. It has been estimated that about $3 trillion is laundered 
annually.4 This figure is not only realistic, but is likely to triple with the fast spread of 
cyberlaundering practices. In 1999, the FATF indicated in its report that the internet 
                                                            
3 See recommendations 12 and 16, Financial Action Task Force (2003: 15). 
4 See Lilley (2006: 40) and Robinson (1998: 16). As at 1998 the amount of money that is laundered 
annually was estimated to be about $300 billion. See Robinson (1998: 16). Also see Singh (2009: 3) 
where it is indicated that the average amount of money laundered in the world could be between two and 
five per cent of the world’s gross domestic product. 
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poses a threat, and might very well fuel money laundering activities.5 We are currently 
witnessing the dawn of this reality. 
Also, considering the rampant nature of this crime, particularly in most of the poor 
countries, there is a crippling effect on the economy. It is sad to note that most of the 
monetary aid given to these countries by charity organizations and governments of the 
western world, never actually see the light of day.6 Due to the poor technological 
framework in these countries, there is poor accountability for these funds. One might 
ask, where do all the funds go? The answer lies in the reality of money laundering, 
which invariably links with the issue of poor governance.7 With the growing awareness 
of the internet’s capabilities, the sky is the limit for criminals seeking to conceal their 
illegal proceeds.8 Given the fact that cyberlaundering has a potentially detrimental effect 
on the economy, the investigation of this new kind of crime becomes of paramount 
importance. 
What is more, cyberlaundering is a lucrative enterprise for terrorist financing. The 
attacks by Al-Qaeda in New York City, on September 11 2001, spawned this reality.9 
After the attacks, the United States government and financial organisations have been 
forced to conduct intense investigations about the medium adopted by terrorists to 
finance their operations. The internet has been constantly identified as the most 
plausible medium.10 
                                                            
5 Financial Action Task Force (2002: 23). 
6 See <http://www.fact-finder.com/file/money_laundering/>   [accessed on 31 July 2010]. 
7 Blunden (2001: 29). 
8 Blunden(2001: 30). 
9 Financial Action Task Force (2010A: 32). 
10 Kellerman (2004: 4). 
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This paper thus has an overall purpose of shedding light on this very grey area of the 
law. It also serves an educational purpose by highlighting the principal challenges which 
cyberlaundering practices present. 
 
 1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Cyberlaundering has proven to be a safe haven for money launderers. In lieu of the 
novel nature of this crime, it becomes crucial to first understand the kind of devil one is 
dealing with. An understanding of this crime is thus the first wall that this paper 
attempts to scale. In addition, the notion of anonymity, which is the very nucleus of the 
internet, is a major obstacle to finding suitable remedies to the problem of 
cyberlaundering. It is also very problematic to establish jurisdiction in the event that a 
cyberlaunderer is caught. 
Therefore, based on these very glaring problems, this paper seeks answers to the 
following questions: 
I. What is cyberlaundering and what does the phenomenon entail? 
II. Are there possible remedies to the cyberlaundering problem? 
III. Who would have prosecutorial jurisdiction in the event that a 
cyberlaunderer is caught? 
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1.4 SCOPE OF RESEARCH 
The concept of cyberlaundering is evolving fast. It appears as if certain countries 
that are fully compliant with the recommendations of the FATF might be able to deter 
its spread as a result of their seemingly effective anti-money laundering (AML) 
regimes.11 The problem of cyberlaundering is, however, intensified in most countries 
with very poor AML regimes. These are mostly countries formerly deemed as non-
compliant countries and territories (NCCTs) by the FATF.12 Thus, the scope of this 
research covers cyberlaundering activities in the latter category of countries, together 
with certain fully compliant countries with effective AML regimes. The relevant 
regulatory measures against money laundering that are in place in the latter category of 
countries would be considered. More importantly, by identifying the various contours of 
cyberlaundering, some practical and contemporary regulatory measures would be 
considered. 
 
1.6 LITERATURE REVIEW 
As a basic foundation, some international instruments are crucial to this paper’s 
enquiry.13 These international instruments have been analysed. Although the concept of 
                                                            
11 For a list of these countries see the Financial Action Task Force (2002: 11). Also see Lilley (2006: 121). 
12 Although as of 13 October 2006, the FATF reports that there are no more NCCTs, most of the delisted 
countries from the list of NCCTs are still closely monitored by the FATF. Some of these countries include 
Cook Islands; The Dominican Republic; Egypt; Grenada; Guatemala; Indonesia; Marshall Islands; 
Myanmar; Nauru; Nigeria; Niue; Philippines; Russia; St. Vincent and the Grenadines; and Ukraine. See 
Financial Action Task Force (2002: 7). 
13 These are: The UN Convention against the illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances, signed on 20 December 1988 and came into force on 1 November 1990. The Warsaw 
Convention: Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the 
Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism, 16.V, (May, 2005); The EU Convention on 
Cybercrimes 23.XI, adopted on 12 April 2001 and came into force on July 2004; the United Nations 
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money laundering as a crime itself is relatively new, unlike cyberlaundering, there have 
been several publications on the subject. Some of these have also been considered.14 
Several commentary articles on cyberlaundering have also been examined.15 
There has not been a reported case law dealing explicitly with cyberlaundering. For 
this reason, factual accounts of cyberlaundering activities, as available on the internet 
and other media outlets have been studied. Some highly informative internet materials 
have been consulted as well.16  
Thus, this research stems from the principles of money laundering as generally 
understood, and it basically builds on existing knowledge of cyberlaundering as 
proffered in some publications. 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, Resolution 55/25, (adopted on 15 November 2000, 
and came into force on 23 September 2003) and the Financial Action Task Force “40 Recommendations, 
plus Nine Special Recommendations” which was issued on 23 June 2003 (available at <http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/forty_recom/pdf> [accessed on the 5th of March, 2010]. 
14See Beare, ME (2005) Critical Reflections on Transnational Organized Crime, Money Laundering and 
Corruption University of Toronto Press: Toronto; Hinsterseer, K (1997) “An Economic Analysis of 
Money Laundering” Journal of Money laundering Control 1, 154; Lilley, P (2006) Dirty Dealing, The 
Untold Truth About Global Money Laundering, International Crime and Terrorism (3rd), London: Kogan 
Page; Madinger, J (2006) “Basic Money Laundering Schemes” in Madinger, J Money Laundering: A 
Guide for Criminal Investigators (2nd ed) Taylor and Francis: Boca Raton; Reuter P and Truman, (2004) 
EM Chasing Dirty Money: The Fight Against Money Laundering Peterson Institute for International 
Economics: Washington DC; Richards, JR (1999) “An Introduction to Money Laundering” in Richards JR 
Transnational Criminal Organizations, Cybercrime, and Money Laundering CRC Press: Boca Raton, and 
Shams, H (2004) “Money Laundering Law: History and Scope” in Shams, H Legal Globalization: Money 
laundering Law and Other Cases British Institute of International and Comparative law: London. 
15 See inter alia: Bortner, M (1996) “Cyberlaundering: Anonymous Digital Cash and Money Laundering” 
<http://osaka.law.miami.edu/~froomkin/seminar/papers/bortner.htm> [accessed on 12 April 2010]; 
Grabosky, P and Smith, R (1998) Crime in the Digital Age, Controlling Telecommunications and 
Cyberspace Illegalities The Federation Press: Sydney; Marshall, CE et al (2005) “Computer Crime in 
Brave New World” in Reichel, P Handbook of Transnational Crime and Justice Sage: Los Angeles; 
Philipson, S (2001) “The Dangers of New Technology -  Laundering on the Internet” 5(1) Journal of 
Money Laundering Control Thomason 89; Ping (2004) “New Trends in Money Laundering – From the 
Real World to Cyberspace” 1(5) Journal of Money laundering Control 50 and Thomason, CV (2009) 
“How has the establishment of the internet changed the way offenders launder their dirty money?” 
Internet Journal of Criminology <http//www.internetjournalofcriminology.com> [accessed on 16 March 
2010]. 
16 These include: eHow (2009) “How to Launder Money” 
<http://www.ehow.com/how_2049841_launder-money.html> [accessed on 5 March 2010], Financial 
Action Task Force (1997) “1996-1997 Report on Money Laundering Typologies” <http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/dataoecd/31/29/34043795.pdf> [accessed on 5 March 2010], and Financial Action Task Force 
(2002) “FATF Annual Report for 2001-2002 Released” <http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/dataoecd/43/53/34949558.pdf> [accessed on 5 March 2010]. 
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1.7 METHODOLOGY 
This research has been conducted pragmatically, on the basis of available resources. 
Primary and secondary sources have been used.17 The quantitative and qualitative 
secondary sources that have been considered are books, articles, journals, official 
publications and the internet, along with media articles. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
17 See complete outline in the list of references. 
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CHAPTER 2 
A BACKGROUND ON MONEY LAUNDERING: THE PRE-
INTERNET ERA 
 
2.1 GENERAL 
Although the principal focus of this paper is cyberlaundering, it is important to 
understand the concept of money laundering which forms the foundation upon which 
cyberlaundering (as it’s subset) is built. A brief history of money laundering and the 
process of money laundering will be shortly sketched. However, because the concept of 
wire transfers is of great importance and is invariably linked to cyberlaundering, this 
chapter will focus on it more closely. 
 
2.2 THE CONCEPT OF MONEY LAUNDERING 
2.2.1 Defining money laundering 
There are several ways in which money laundering can be defined. Sometimes 
money laundering is defined as it pertains to the legal jurisdiction or the relevant context 
within which one operates. This has caused great disparities with its precise definition.18 
                                                            
18 For instance, in the United States, money laundering is generally defined as the practice of disguising 
illegally obtained funds so that they seem legal. See Lilley (2006: 10). On the other hand, in the United 
Kingdom, it refers to any financial transaction which generates an asset or value as the result of an illegal 
act like tax evasion, or false bookkeeping (therefore a predicate offence). See Hinterseer (1997: 154). In 
India, it is any process connected with the proceeds of crime and projecting it as untainted property. See 
Pillai & Julian (2008: 6). 
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An encompassing definition by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) is as follows: 
 ‘Money laundering is the attempt to conceal or disguise the 
ownership or source of the proceeds of criminal activity and to 
integrate them into legitimate financial systems in such a way that 
they cannot be distinguished from assets by legitimate means. 
Typically, this involves the conversion of cash-based proceeds to 
account-based proceeds.’19 
The underlying purpose of money laundering is to reduce the risk of confiscating 
illegal proceeds, so that the launderer can spend and enjoy the profits easily. This 
rationale is key to the concept of cyberlaundering. This fact is further elucidated by the 
FATF’s definition of money laundering. It defines it as the processing of criminal 
proceeds to disguise their illegal origin.20 From this basis, the meaning of 
cyberlaundering can be deduced. Cyberlaundering, in simple terms, means using the 
mechanism of the internet to launder “dirty money.” A better understanding of 
cyberlaundering and how it operates is provided in the following chapter. 
 
2.2.2 A brief history of money laundering 
The history of money laundering has long been associated with certain individuals 
like Al Capone, Meyer Lansky and Frank Abegnale, amongst a slew of other notorious 
                                                            
19 See the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (2002) “Glossary of statistical terms” 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/cpssoob.pdf> [accessed on 23 March 2010].  
20 Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (2001: 2). 
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fraudsters in the 20th century.21 However, these individuals were not exactly charged 
with money laundering. The term “money laundering” was first used during the 
Watergate scandal in the United States which led to the impeachment of President 
Richard Nixon.22 However, the advent of money laundering as a crime can be traced 
back to the Bank Secrecy Act,23 which was enacted in the United States. The Bank 
Secrecy Act is significant because it introduced the “Know Your Customer” (KYC) 
principle, in terms of which financial institutions are required to scrutinize their 
customers and keep records of their transactions.24 Also, certain reporting requirements 
were ensconced in the Act, like the reporting of all transactions exceeding $10,000 and 
transfer of value exceeding $5000.25 
Another significant legislative enactment is the Money Laundering Control Act of 
1986,26 which was adopted in the US as a response to the shortcomings of the Bank 
Secrecy Act. The unfortunate consequence that resulted from the stringent provisions of 
the Bank Secrecy Act was the act of smurfing.27 In terms of the Money Laundering 
                                                            
21Al Capone was prosecuted by the United States government for tax evasion and fraud in the 1940s. 
Meyer Lansky, or the so-called “mob’s accountant,” was notorious for siphoning funds with Swiss Bank 
accounts in the 1960s and 1970s. Frank Abegnale was the so-called “gangster-turned-saint” whose very 
fraudulent and evasive ways in the 1970s and 1980s later became a valuable asset for the FBI, for which 
he later worked. See Madinger (2006: 43) and Robinson (1998:12). 
22 The Guardian newspaper, which reported on the scandal, used the word “laundering” to refer to how 
President Nixon and the members of his campaign team moved money from the United States to Mexico.  
See <http://www.wikipedia.com/money_laundering/>   [accessed on 20 August 2010]. 
23Act 31 of 1970, C.F.R. 
24 See section 100 of the Act. 
25 See sections 101 and 221 of the Act. At the time, the constitutionality of the Act was contested in the 
case of California Bankers Association v Schultz 39 L Ed 2d 812 (1974). However, the Act was later 
upheld as constitutional in the decision of the US Supreme Court (416 US. 21 1974). See Bortner (1996: 
2). 
26 Act 18 of 1986, U.S.C. 
27 The term smurfing refers to a structured deposit system in terms of which a launderer (or “smurf”) 
deliberately deposits money below the reportable threshold into various accounts.  This is purposely done 
to evade suspicion, because deposits of that precise amount or above would require the filing of a cash 
transaction report (CTR). There could be either one or multiple smurfs involved in this operation. 
Filipkowski (2008: 6). 
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Control Act, failure to comply with the reporting requirements laid down by the Bank 
Secrecy Act is criminalised.28 This legislation also adopted the filing of currency 
transaction report (CTR) by banks. The Act is still very relevant today. 
Several other legislative landmarks are important to the evolution of the anti-money 
laundering (AML) regime. In May 1973, a treaty called the U.S.–Switzerland Mutual 
Legal Assistance on Criminal Matters,29 was concluded. It catapulted money laundering 
into the international arena, even though only to limited extent, by creating the 
necessary awareness of procedural terms for dealing with it at law. In July 1977, Swiss 
Banks in Switzerland concluded the “Agreement on the Observance of Care and 
Accepting Funds and on the Practising of Bank Secrecy,” which secured the expanding 
Swiss financial sector by preventing abuses of bank secrecy.30 
 
2.2.3 The money laundering process 
Money laundering could be deemed to be a theatre of disguise involving various 
actors, roles and sequences. Some find the act of money laundering very synonymous 
with the process of laundering dirty clothes; the washing, drying and ironing stages.31 Its 
complexity has often led to its division into the placement, layering and integration 
stages.32 The next chapter looks at these stages in greater detail, because 
cyberlaundering also follows the same pattern.  
                                                            
28 See Section 103(2). 
29 The treaty was enacted on May 25 1973 and came into force on January 23 1977. 
30 See Articles 3-7 of the agreement. 
31 Singh (2009: 6). 
32 See Hinterseer (1997: 154). 
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The placement stage refers to the initial stage where funds derived from illegal 
activities are moved to a place (usually a traditional or non-traditional financial 
institution) convenient for the launderer and less suspicious to law enforcement 
agencies.33 The layering stage refers to the process whereby the money is separated from 
its true origin to feign legitimacy. The criminal usually disguises the ownership of the 
funds by scattering these proceeds across the commercial sphere. The layering process is 
especially crucial to the cyberlaundering process.34 
Otherwise known as the final process in the money laundering cycle when the clean 
clothes are taken out of the dryer, the integration phase entails converting illegal 
proceeds to legitimate business or enterprises by way of financial or commercial 
operations.35 
 
2.2.4 Conventional money laundering mechanisms 
The concept of money laundering is a constantly evolving phenomenon, and 
criminals constantly seek out avenues to hide the proceeds of crime from law 
enforcement agencies. The most recent avenue, which is cyberlaundering, is the subject 
of this paper. Prior to the internet era, criminals commonly used shell companies,36 cash 
                                                            
33 Financial Action Task Force (2010B: 23). 
34 See paragraph 3.3.3 below. 
35 See Shams (2004: 23) and Hinterseer (1997: 91). 
36 Shell companies operate under the guise of corporate entities conducting legitimate businesses, while in 
reality they are have no assets and are inoperative. However, some of these companies do partly conduct 
legitimate businesses. Money launderers hide the proceeds of their crimes under these front companies, 
which are now rampant on the internet. See Madinger (2008: 65). 
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smuggling,37 illicit third party influences,38  and smurfing,39 amongst several other 
methods. 
                                                                                                                                                              
2.3 WIRE TRANSFERS: A SHIFT FROM THE HARD CASH SYSTEM 
2.3.1 General  
 What is better known as the second milestone in the development of money 
laundering is the wire transfer system, which is the intermediate between the typical 
hard cash system and the internet-based system. Wire transfers are especially important 
for most underdeveloped countries with poor or totally non-existent internet facilities 
crucial for banking operations.40 This subject is thus vital to the issue of regulating and 
controlling cyberlaundering activities. 
 
2.3.2 The meaning of wire transfers 
 Due to the advancement of technology, wire transfers originated in the 1970s and 
1980s from banking institutions which sought the luxury and convenience of 
transferring funds without having to handle the cash physically. The wire transfer of 
money refers to the electronic transfer of funds (albeit its value) at the request of a 
                                                            
37 This is arguably the oldest and simplest form of money laundering. It is a placement system in terms of 
which bulk cash is shipped across the border via either a cargo or other means. See Reuters and Truman 
(2006: 49). 
38 A typical example is the so-called “hawala” system. This is common in most European and Asian 
countries. In terms of this system, a person (who is usually not a citizen of the country where he is 
resident) sends out money internationally to persons in another country. Instead of the traditional banking 
avenue, an intermediary is used who physically gives the money to the recipient at a lower commission to 
that which a bank would charge. See Singh (2009: 6). 
39 See footnote 25 supra. 
40 See Zeldin and Florio (2007: 187) for more details. 
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customer from one bank account to a beneficiary account, which is usually another 
bank. A wire transfer can either be effected locally or internationally.41 Since the 
transferred funds are electronic in nature, only the actual value of the funds is 
transferred.  
 In the past, wire transfers were effected by cable. Today banks do this electronically. 
The popular method by which funds are electronically transferred (internationally) is 
through an electronic funds messaging service called the Society for Worldwide 
Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT).42 SWIFT is primarily used to 
process significantly high transactions. For example, SWIFT is used to process credit 
payments of up to $2 million in the U.S. and about R5 million in South Africa.43 It is 
also used to process debit transfers of up to $100,000 in the U.S. and R500, 000 in South 
Africa.44 
 
2.3.3 The problem with wire transfers 
 Money launderers have found a loophole in the SWIFT messaging system. When 
filing the forms, banks are generally required to fill out certain mandatory fields on the 
form with certain basic information of the originator (person giving the instruction) such 
as the account number, the originator’s name and address, and beneficiary details. 
Herein lies the problem. Although the wire transfer will be rejected if these mandatory 
                                                            
41 Pillai and Julian (2008: 219). Also see Reuter and Truman (2006: 34). 
42 Although other electronic funds message service exists, SWIFT is the most popular. About 2,600 banks 
throughout the world, in over 65 countries, are part of the SWIFT service. See eHow “How SWIFT wires 
funds” <http://www.ehow.com/swift/> [accessed on 4 June 2010]. 
43 Pillai and Julian (2008: 219). 
44 Pillai and Julian (2008: 220). See also Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (2009: 43). 
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fields are not populated, should the mandatory fields be filled in with any type of 
characters, the wire transfer would succeed. This helps money launderers because they 
can easily provide false information. Verification of this data is in many instances not 
done, or poorly done, thereby frustrating the work of law enforcement agencies in the 
process. This situation is further compounded by the fact that many countries have still 
not reached the acceptable standard of compliance in terms recommendations 10 (record 
keeping) and 11 (unusual transactions) of the FATF’s “40 Recommendations.”45 
 
2.3.4 A bridge between wire transfers and cyberlaundering 
 The mechanisms available to individual countries for regulating illicit financial 
dealings are ultimately decisive. It is for this reason that the FATF was established in 
1989. There is no doubt that several distinct problems and challenges inherent in various 
countries are stumbling blocks to the creation of a comprehensive and stringent anti-
money laundering (AML) regime. In most democratic countries, money launderers take 
advantage of the highly revered privacy rights which they use to circumvent the 
reporting and information requirements stipulated by numerous AML laws. In this 
respect, cyberlaundering bears a great similarity to wire transfers because they both 
share a similar challenge. The only difference is the fact that cyberlaundering is causing 
far greater damage compared to wire transfers. With the rapid growth of technology and 
                                                            
45 See the Financial Action Task Force (2003: 20). South Africa is a good example. Regardless of the 
stringent laws enacted by the South African government against laundering activities, the FATF still 
deems the South African government partially compliant with its recommendations. See E-Standard 
Forum (2009: 12). Very few countries such as the U.S. and Germany are considered to be fully compliant 
with those recommendations. 
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the internet in most underdeveloped countries, money launderers who are using the 
avenue of wire transfers are upgrading to the channel of cyberlaundering. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 CYBERLAUNDERING 
 
3.1 GENERAL 
 This chapter sets out to unravel the structure of cyberlaundering. In doing this, it will 
contribute to a better understanding of how cyberlaundering works.  
 
3.2 THE CONCEPT OF CYBERLAUNDERING 
3.2.1 The meaning of cyberlaundering 
 Cyberlaundering is a system in terms of which the mechanism of the internet is used 
to hide funds derived from illegal activities in order to make such funds less traceable 
and less suspicious to law enforcement agencies. This new breed of money laundering 
was heralded by the exponential increase of electronic finance (e-finance) since the late 
1990s.46 
 
3.2.2 E- money 
 Although the notion of cyberlaundering is a concept that stems from the advent of the 
internet, the very root of the problem is the reality of electronic money. Electronic 
money (otherwise called e-money) refers to an internet based system of legal tender 
                                                            
46 Kellerman (2004: 2). 
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which does not take the form of currency notes, but instead takes the form of certain 
electronic impulses of 1s and 0s (also referred to as digital bits).47 One might ask, why 
e-money? For a cyberlaunderer, several reasons exist why e-money is advantageous:48 
1. E-money is faster to transfer. 
2. E-money is faster to circulate from one geographical account to another. 
3. It is easier to hide from law enforcement agencies. 
4. It is easier to invest in illegitimate businesses. 
 According to the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN),49 e-money is 
advanced through various different electronic payment mediums (or Electronic Payment 
Technologies- EPTs). The underlying rationale behind the use of EPTs is explained 
thus:50 
‘The common element is that these systems are designed to provide the 
transacting party with immediate, convenient, secure and potentially 
anonymous means by which to transfer financial value. When fully 
implemented, this technology will impact users world-wide and provide 
readily apparent benefits to legitimate commerce; however, it may also 
have the potential to facilitate the international movement of illicit 
funds.’ 
 
                                                            
47 See Ask “E-Payments” <http://www.ask.com/what is e-money?/ files/e_payment_methods/> [accessed 
on 8 June 2010]. See also Molander, et al (1998: 2). 
48 Pillai and Julian (2008: 99). 
49 This is the financial intelligence centre of the US Department of Treasury. It is one of the major 
enforcement agencies put in place by the US government to regulate and control financial crimes. See the 
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (2009: 20). 
50Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (an undated website document) “Money in Cyberspace” 
<http://www.fincen.org/resource-moneyincyberspace/1212> [accessed on 17 June 2010]. 
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3.2.2.1 Smart cards 
 Today, when transacting on the internet, various internet service providers (ISPs) use 
different EPT systems for making payments. However, of these various types, smart 
cards are clearly the most efficient and common means of obtaining electronic cash. 
Smart cards are generally easy to use. One can credit the card with funds and then use it 
as either a debit card or a credit card, depending on the purpose the user has in mind.51 A 
better explanation is the following: 
‘A smart card looks much like a credit card. Consumers purchase smart 
cards and load them with electronic money at a vending machine, bank, 
Automated Teller Machine, personal computer (over the Internet), or 
through a specially equipped telephone. Once the e-cash is loaded on the 
card, the money can then be spent over the Internet or through other 
communication devices.’52 
  
 The main cause of concern with smart cards is primarily the method by which money 
is transferred onto the card. Generally speaking, a smart card can be loaded 
telephonically, or at an ATM machine, or by a direct online transfer from one’s bank 
account, or from the hard drive of one’s computer, or from cyberspace (in which case, 
the money is usually stolen),53 or either by some form of electronic wallet (e-wallet) via 
which funds can be moved from one card to another.54 This is where the popular 
MONDEX card, which is part of MasterCard International,  has an advantage, for it 
                                                            
51 See Reuter and Truman (2006: 123). 
52 The United States Government Accounting Office (2009: 78). 
53 An example would be where a criminal acquires monetary value by stealing another’s details like a 
credit card or account number. This is called identity theft. 
54 The United States Government Accounting Office (2009: 78). 
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permits the free and easy transfer of funds from one person to another, doing away with 
the complexity of other smart cards that require transactions to be reported to a central 
computer system.55 This very fact strikes at the heart of cyberlaundering.56  
 Also, the PayPal card is another kind of smart card which opens up an avenue for 
money laundering because, just as with most other kinds of smart cards, it does not 
require one to have a bank account. Persons with false identities can therefore possess it. 
Interestingly, gift cards, which are often used by most departmental stores, are now 
being used by cyberlaunderers, because it is just another form of smart card. 
 The use of smart cards, just like other electronic cash systems which facilitates e-
money, often circumvents the Know Your Customer (KYC) procedures, because 
majority of internet service providers (ISPs) are unscrupulous about their customers. 
Most online applications by customers for an e-money account, which usually requires 
the customer to provide certain personal information, are not verified by these ISPs. For 
example, the Freedom Eagle Cash Card, which is predominant in the United Kingdom, 
does not require any kind of identification from potential customers. New customers can 
thus purchase it online within minutes. Also, this kind of smart card can be recharged 
repeatedly, with no actual limit on the value stored on the card.57 A cyberlaunderer 
could not be more content with such an unfettered payment system. 
 
 
                                                            
55 See <http://www.mondexcard.com/about/file838/> [accessed on 17 June 2010]. 
56 This was noted by Stanley Morris (the director of FinCEN) in his 1995 speech to the Congress Banking 
committee, available at <http://www.fincen.org/resource> [accessed on 17 June 2010]. 
57 For more details see <http://www.freedom-card.co.uk/> [accessed on 2 September 2010]. 
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3.2.3 Models of cyberspace payment systems 
 The business of a cyberlaunderer flourishes due to the anonymity feature of e-money. 
The mere fact that money is represented in digital bits makes the identity of the 
launderer undetectable. Since the internet facilitates cyberspace payments, another key 
consequence of the anonymity feature is the fact that it defies jurisdictional barriers. 
Funds can be moved from one jurisdiction to another without regulation and 
interception. The World Bank identifies four concrete cyber-based payment systems 
promoting money laundering capabilities.58 These are the Merchant-Issuer model, the 
Bank-Issuer model, the Non-Bank and Peer-to-Peer models. The latter two models are 
most problematic. It is important to understand these models because they represent the 
different possibilities of payment systems on the internet. They consequently represent 
the core of cyberlaundering involving electronic cash (or e-cash). These models are 
briefly discussed below. 
 
3.2.3.1 The Merchant-Issuer Model 
 This model entails a scenario where both the issuer of a smart card, or pre-paid card, 
and the seller of goods are the same. Good examples are the Oyster card59 used by the 
Transport of London, Barclaycard,60 Visa card61 and the Octopus card62 used by the 
                                                            
58 Kellerman (2004: 3). 
59 See <http:// www.tfl.gov.uk/oyster/> [accessed on 12 September 2010]. 
60 See <http://www.barclaycard.co.uk/> [accessed on 1 August 2010]. 
61 See <http://www.visa.com/> [accessed on 19 August 2010]. 
62 See <http://www.octopuscards.com/ [accessed on 24 August 2010]. 
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Hong Kong transit system.63 However, some merchants under this category could also 
be the operators of illegitimate businesses. For example, these merchants could be an 
organized crime syndicate, or might be operating a business online which conducts 
criminal activities. These merchants often try to conceal their identities from law 
enforcement officers. Research has shown that the majority of these companies are 
registered in certain strategic locations such as Costa Rica, Curacao, Antigua and 
Cyprus.64  
 
3.2.3.2 The Bank-Issuer Model 
 This model is based on the traditional financial system where the issuers and sellers 
or merchants are entirely different entities. A typical case is the common bank-customer 
relationship. The debit card used by account holders of banks is a very good example. 
 
3.2.3.3 The Non-Bank Issuer Model 
 This model is very problematic because it is factually common place among 
cyberlaunderers. In this case, users purchase e-cash from issuers using traditional cash. 
These users then proceed to conclude transactions with participating merchants who 
accept e-cash. The merchants would then redeem the traditional cash equivalent of the e-
                                                            
63 Jamali (2009: 14). 
64 Reuter and Truman (2006: 124). 
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cash from the original issuers.65 Examples of this sort are the electronic coin product of 
Cybercash,66 the Virgin Card67 and the Freedom Eagle Card.68 
 
3.2.3.4 Peer-to-Peer Model 
 This is a more flexible payment system in terms of which e-cash is transferable 
between users, regardless of whether or not a bank or non-bank issued the e-cash. 
Because the e-card is transferable, the point of contact with payment via traditional cash 
is only when the e-cash is issued and when it is redeemed.69 Therefore, a person who has 
an e-wallet (which is a form of smart card) could easily transfer funds to another friend 
who has the same. An example is the MONDEX stored value card.70 A trendier example 
of this system is e-gold trading, which has also become a fertile ground for 
cyberlaundering operations.71 
 The dilemma which this system creates, as identified above, is basically that a money 
launderer could easily transfer funds from his or her e-wallet to an associate in a totally 
different jurisdiction who has the same. This appears fascinating because the transaction 
would reflect that it originates from another e-wallet provider company, and not from 
the issuer bank if originally issued by a bank.72 A very complex trail could as well be 
                                                            
65 Kellerman (2004: 3). 
66 See <http://www.cybercash.com/about/file/> [accessed on 9 June 2010]. 
67 The Virgin pre-paid cards are especially popular in the USA, South Africa, UK and other parts of 
Europe. See <http://www.virgin.co.uk/pre-paidcards/> [accessed on 9 June 2010]. 
68 See <http://www.freedomeagle.com> [accessed on 9 June 2010].  
69 Jamali (2009: 14).  
70 See <http://www.mondex.com/about/> [accessed on 9 June 2010]. Another very similar example is the 
PayPal funds transfer services. See <http://www.paypal.com> [accessed on 9 June 2010]. 
71 See paragraph 3.4.5 below. 
72 See Reuter and Truman (2006: 125). 
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created where the initial launderer sends or transfers money to different e-wallets at 
different times. 
 
3.3 THE CYBERLAUNDERING CYCLE 
3.3.1 General 
 Just as one would commonly find with the conventional system of money laundering, 
the cyberlaundering practice assumes a three-stage process which includes the 
placement, layering and integration stages. 
 
3.3.2 Placement 
 The placement stage is an example of how e-money is often used. In this instance, the 
proceeds of crime in the form of e-money can be used to buy foreign currency or goods 
for the purpose of re-selling them.73  E-money can also be exchanged from one person to 
another without an intermediary involved. This system is fostered by the feature of 
anonymity, which is the bedrock upon which cyberlaundering operations thrive. Thus, 
‘e-money may be used to place dirty money without having to smuggle cash or conduct 
face-to-face transactions.’74 
 “Dirty money” can be placed using various techniques of cyberlaundering, primarily 
by way of using online casinos.75 When a person gambles, or buys casino chips with 
                                                            
73 Philippsohn (2001: 489). 
74 Philippsohn (2001: 490). Also see Jamali (2009: 14). 
75 See paragraph 3.4.4 below. 
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dirty money and wins, the casino refunds such a person in cash, thus legitimating the 
money. Also, e-gold appears to be a very lucrative avenue for placing dirty money.76 
Other methods of placement include transfers done from an ATM, transfers of values 
stored in one’s hard-drive or email account, or sometimes telephonically.77 
 
3.3.3 Layering 
 This stage represents the cyberlaunderer’s attempt at an ultimate disguise. The money 
is separated from its true origin and spread or “layered” through different techniques. 
Online banking would be the most applicable cyberlaundering technique for this 
purpose. This stage also gives a clear example of how wired transfers bear relevance to 
cyberlaundering. As mentioned earlier,78 the loophole that the wire transfer system 
creates is the poor CTR and other reporting requirements, which are evident. The result 
is that a person can use an online bank to open an account without providing his or her 
true personal information and without the bank authenticating such person’s proof of 
identity.79 A cyberlaunderer is thus able to open different bank accounts online with a 
false identity. Consequently, through this process, audit trails are not created as 
compared to the physical transfer of funds from one jurisdiction to another. 
 
 
                                                            
76 See paragraph 3.4.5 below. 
77 As an example, an existing customer of a smart card company could call the company to reload an 
exhausted smart card. 
78 See paragraph 2.3.3 supra. 
79 Jamali (2009: 14). 
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3.3.4 Integration 
 Here, the cyberlaunderer seeks to make the proceeds of crime legitimate by 
integrating them into the broad commercial market. The cyberlaunderer accomplishes 
this mainly by opening shell companies which ostensibly render different services. The 
company is called a “shell company” because services need not be rendered in that 
company as the company is created merely as a camouflage.80 It would thus seem as 
though the payments that have been made are for services provided. Online casinos are 
good examples of this.81  
 Unlike the traditional means of integration, which primarily entail the use of false 
invoices of goods, internet service providers (ISPs) record more profits and their 
services are not jurisdiction-bound. Thus, where the funds are transferred by foreign 
banks, there is less suspicion.82 
 
3.4 CYBERLAUNDERING METHODS AND TECHNIQUES 
3.4.1 General 
 Although there are numerous avenues adopted and utilized for cyberlaundering 
purposes, it would be wise to confine one’s study to those techniques which are 
currently most prevalent. For this reason, this aspect focuses primarily on online 
                                                            
80 Hinterseer (1997: 160). 
81 Filipkowski (2008: 6). 
82 See Jamali (2009: 14), and <http://www.apacs.org.uk/resources_publications/card_facts_figurse.html> 
[accessed 12 June 2010]. 
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banking, digital payment methods, online casinos, online auction sites, online gambling 
and virtual communities. 
 
3.4.2 Online banking 
 Online banking enables a customer of an internet-based bank to perform regular 
banking activities like account inquiries, payment of bills and transfer of funds, using 
the internet. With the click of a mouse and from the comfort of one’s home, a customer 
can conclude certain transactions without being physically present at the bank. The 
advantages of banking online are amongst the numerous rewards that come with the 
advent of the internet. A recent study has shown that 97.7% of all the banks in the world 
today, regardless of where they are located, are now internet-based.83 The world has 
clearly become a cyber hub. 
 The intricacies typical with online banking have caused it to be a “safe vehicle” for 
cyberlaunderers.  Cyberlaunderers are having a fine ride with this technique. Online 
banking can be used to aid cyberlaundering in primarily two ways. Firstly, the ease at 
which an account can be opened on the internet at an internet-based bank is the first 
invitation to cyberlaunderers.  The main catch here is that there is no authentic 
verification of the potential customer’s identity. Therefore, the face-to-face check 
conducted when one banks in the conventional way is not performed. The true identity 
of the criminal seated at the other end of the computer remains unknown, and whatever 
information is provided for the opening of his or her account is the only evidence seen 
                                                            
83 See <http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is-online-banking92338/> [accessed on 12 June 2010]. 
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by the bank. Secondly, online banking is advantageous to the cyberlaunderer because it 
is the perfect avenue for smurfing. The layering stage of the cyberlaundering cycle can 
therefore be completed when the smurfs disperse the ill-derived funds to various other 
accounts by means of online banking.84 The other twin tool that accords with this 
method is the use of smart cards. By way of the peer-to-peer payment system, and using 
an online bank, a criminal can move e-money from one card to another card in the 
possession of another person in cahoots with him. This is actually possible, given that 
the conventional banking “Know Your Customer” (KYC) principle, which requires 
banks to report suspicious transactions to law enforcement agencies, does not directly 
apply to online banks.85  
 Jurisdiction is the main reason why online banking cannot be easily regulated. The 
place where an online bank’s website is registered does not fall within the limits of any 
international standard regulating it.86 It is still unclear which country would have 
jurisdiction where the website of an online bank is registered in a place different from 
where the customer operates.87 Since such international norm is lacking, the gaping 
lacuna that exists as a result of online banking is made wider. To compound the 
situation, most countries still refuse to cooperate with one another in sharing intelligence 
on the matter.88 
 Furthermore, online banking is rendered prone to cyberlaunderers because of the 
complex encryption methods currently used by hackers on the internet. Hackers can 
                                                            
84 See paragraph 2.2.4 supra. 
85 For more details see Filipkowski (2008: 6). 
86 Jamali (2009: 18). 
87 See discussion in paragraph 4.6.3 below. 
88 Filipkwoski (2008: 9). 
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encrypt certain programs to transfer funds electronically from one bank account to 
another without leaving a trail behind for law enforcement agencies.89 Furthermore, 
these hackers make use of special information retrieving viruses to steal the bank details 
of other bank customers such as their credit card numbers. This is termed identity theft. 
A cyberlaunderer could use the stolen information when conducting certain banking 
operations online.90 The current trend is for criminals to purchase fake identities from 
hackers for the purpose of opening a bank account online which would eventually 
secure the placement and layering stages of cyberlaundering.91 
 
3.4.2.1 Online banking: A hypothetical scenario 
 A hypothetical scenario of a way (amongst several others) in which cyberlaunderer 
operates using online banking is given below: 
Mr Adams, a student with little means of livelihood, is very conversant with the 
internet. He constantly browses job websites like www.gumtree.com and 
www.jobangels.com in search of job opportunities. Mr Brice, on the other hand, 
is a fraudster who runs a fake charity organization on the internet called 
www.HelpHaitiNow.com (a shell company) amongst several illegal activities he 
operates. Mr Brice has opened a special bank account online for this charity 
organization under the name Help Haiti Now. By means of a cash-in-hand 
                                                            
89 Marshall et al (2005: 115). 
90 Marshall et al (2005: 115). 
91Jamali (2009: 18). Another method by way of which one’s identity can be stolen online is the use of 
spoof websites. These websites make certain attractive offers to the visitors with the condition that they 
provide certain personal details of theirs. See Atta-Asamoah (2009: 109). 
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arrangement (as could also be by way of “common purpose”) Mr Adams and Mr 
Brice cross paths (as guests to these job sites) and eventually reach an 
agreement. Mr Brice aims to siphon his illegally derived funds onto the 
mainstream commercial sector. He deposits a portion of his ill-derived funds into 
his savings account in B Bank (placement). Mr Brice then loads several smart 
cards and gift cards with the remaining funds, at different times. He then gives 
some of these cards to Mr Adams (the smurf) with the instruction to visit the 
charity organization and to make deposits under different identities to the bank 
account of the charity organization as well as his own personal bank accounts at 
strategic intervals (layering). Mr Adams performs all these operations online by 
using the online banking system of B Bank. Note: The work of the smurf, Mr 
Adams, can be performed by Mr Brice himself and can as well be performed by 
several others acting as smurfs. 
 
3.4.3 Online auctions 
 Online auctioning is currently a booming industry on the internet. However, it also 
has a loophole for cyberlaundering purposes. An online auction website allows persons 
registered on such site to put up items for sale on the site. Other persons registered on 
that very site can bid for such an item, and just as is the case with a typical auction sale, 
the item is sold to the person with the highest bid. Once this is done, the buyer sends the 
agreed amount to the company’s bank account whilst the seller directly sends the item or 
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product to the buyer. The company would then eventually pay the seller and charge its 
own commission if the buyer finds the product acceptable as advertised.92 
 The threat level with this system does not appear high because, in the ordinary course 
of events, the company is a legitimate one. The loophole is in the bidding process. A 
smurf could exploit this avenue by continuously bidding higher and higher, because in 
an auction sale without reserve, there is no limit to the bid made by a buyer. 
 
3.4.3.1  Online auctions: A hypothetical scenario 
 A hypothetical scenario of how cyberlaundering could work through the avenue of 
online auctions is as follows: 
Mr Brice is a drug dealer who leaves in Sydney. He wishes to convert the 
proceeds of his crime to legitimate wealth. He is registered on the auction site 
called Auction Express (www.AuctionExpress.com). In cahoots with Mr Adams 
(his smurf, who lives in Israel and is also registered on the same auction site), he 
agrees to put a painting up for sale on the same auction site at a specific time. He 
purchases a smart card which he loads with the proceeds of his illegal earnings. 
He sends the encryptions of the smart card to the email address of Mr Adams, 
who thereafter decrypts it and extracts the value in the smart card. At the agreed 
time, the painting is put up on the auction site. Mr Adams bids the highest for the 
painting, and the painting is consequently sold to him. Mr Adams then pays the 
money to the bank account of Auction Express, and Mr Brice sends the painting 
                                                            
92 See Filipkowski (2008: 10). 
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to Mr Adams. After the necessary verifications have been made, Auction 
Express then pays the money to Mr Brice (which then takes the form of clean 
legitimate money). Note: This activity could be done simultaneously, as it is 
possible for Mr Brice to use multiple smurfs. 
 
3.4.4 Online gambling 
Online gambling has been defined as “the provision of opportunities to play games 
of chance or obtain access to sports or race bookmaking via computer networks.”93 
Generally speaking, conventional casinos are often used to launder money. This is why 
various countries have very strict laws in place to govern the operations of casinos. The 
primary difference between online gambling and the traditional casino is the fact that 
one in every five persons who visits an online gambling site is deemed to be a 
pathological gambler in comparison to the same ratio of persons who visit a traditional 
casino.94 This fact is justified by several factors. Firstly, online casinos, just like any 
other internet based activity, is very convenient to use from the comfort of one’s home. 
Also, in light of the fact that there are thousands of online gambling sites on the 
internet,95 most online gambling sites entice customers to gamble for free for a 
stipulated number of minutes or hours, or at a very low discounted rate. This is hardly 
the case with traditional casinos. 
                                                            
93 Musimanga (1998: 53). See the Financial Action Task Force (2008: 44). Also see annexure. 
94 See <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/politics/article620834.ece> [accessed on 21 July, 2010]. 
95As of 2009, it was reported that a total number of 1,800 online gambling sites exist on the internet, and 
this number continues to grow. See The United States Government Accounting Office (2009: 41). 
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Cyberlaundering via the avenue of online gambling can follow two major routes. A 
cyberlaunderer could either exploit a very legitimate web-based online gambling service 
for laundering purposes, or could set up an online gambling service for the purpose of 
cleaning “dirty” money.96 The first method is not common because of its inherent risks 
for cyberlaunderers. Usually, with a legitimate web-based system, a cyberlaunderer 
lacks actual control over the gaming activities and stands the chance of either winning or 
losing real money. The second scenario involving the establishment of an online casino, 
primarily for money laundering, is a more common form, because of its putative nature. 
The real danger of online gambling lies in this latter form. 
The act of smurfing is commonly adopted by criminals using online gambling as a 
bedrock for their money laundering operations. Smurfs can be given cash by a criminal 
to play games on such a criminal’s online casino (in light of the second form highlighted 
above). This excludes the commission which the criminal pays them. Whether these 
smurfs eventually win or lose, either way, the criminal wins because the proceeds revert 
to him or her. This system is also called “the drumming up business scenario.”97 
Cyberlaunderers could not be more content because of the “jurisdictional freedom” 
central to online casinos. This is typical with most cyber crimes. The borderless nature 
of the internet makes it nearly impossible to effectively regulate and control online 
casinos. This is a big problem whether or not a country has chosen to legalize internet 
                                                            
96 Bumeter (2001: 2). There is usually a third form of online gambling which is called  live-based 
gambling, which enables players to interact with one another online while playing, but is of little 
significance compared to the other two forms. 
97 See Bumeter (2001: 7) and  Jamali (2009: 28). 
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gambling. Currently, in about 50 countries, internet gambling is legalized.98 Only in 
very few countries like India99 is internet gambling illegal. In the United States (US), 
although internet gambling is not per se considered illegal, in terms of the Wire Act,100 
the electronic transmission of betting and wagering activities is illegal. 
The feature of anonymity is also a constant denominator in cases where criminals 
use online casinos to launder money, just as we see with respect to other 
cyberlaundering avenues. On a full-blown scale of money laundering via online 
gambling, criminals who own online casinos try to avoid the registration of their internet 
provider (IP) addresses. They do this by situating these sites in places with week anti-
money laundering (AML) laws. These are usually places that are formerly deemed by 
the FATF as Non-Compliant Countries and Territories (NCCTs). 
 
3.4.4.1 Online gambling: An hypothetical scenario 
As indicated earlier, the “drumming up business scenario” appears to be the most 
popular method by which money can be laundered using online casinos. A practical 
assessment of this is illustrated below. 
Mr Brice is a drug dealer who resides in the state of Massachusetts in the US 
(a country which has an effective AML regime). His aim is to convert the 
proceeds of his crime to legitimate wealth. Mr Adams and several other 
                                                            
98 This is evident in most European countries and some parts of the Caribbean. In Africa, only South 
Africa has express provisions legalizing internet gambling, although subject to certain regulations in terms 
of its National Gambling Act 7 of 2004. 
99 See Part 1 of the Bombay Wager Act IV of 1887. 
100 The Federal Wire Act 87 of 1961, U.S.C. 
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people like him run online casinos in Pakistan, a country with a poor AML 
regime. Mr Brice gets in touch with Mr Adams for the sake of cooperating 
and solidifying ties with him and several other online casino owners in 
Pakistan. Mr Brice uses Mr Adams and the others as an army of smurfs for 
his operations. He obtains their e-mail addresses, and purchases smart cards 
which he loads with equal financial values. Mr Brice then sends the details of 
these cards to the smurfs in Pakistan, using encrypted software. These smurfs 
then decrypt the details of the smart cards, and consequently register at Mr 
Adams’s casino. The smurfs afterwards use the value of the smart cards to 
play and deliberately lose all the funds to Mr Adams’ casino. This excludes 
the commission which they are individually given. The proceeds then revert 
to Mr Brice in the form of monthly instalments from either Mr Adams or 
(strategically) each smurf involved. On the flipside, should the smurfs win, 
the proceeds are again forwarded to Mr Brice also in the form of monthly 
instalments. Note: This could be only a slice of the pie, because Mr Brice can 
simultaneously make a similar arrangement with smurfs in various other 
countries. 
 
3.4.5 Digital Payment Systems 
According to the FATF, the rationale behind establishing digital payment systems 
arises from the fact that it helps with certain key transactions on the internet without 
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regard to traditional currencies, or foreign exchange concerns.101 The most accepted 
form of digital payments is the e-gold system, and this would be analyzed in greater 
detail. 
E-gold is a form of electronic currency created for the World Wide Web. It is 
issued by e-gold Ltd, a Nevis corporation which is backed 100% by gold bullion in 
allocated storage.102 The uniqueness of this form of electronic currency exists in how it 
is totally unrelated to traditional national currencies like the US dollar or the Japanese 
yen. E-gold operates by virtue of an account-based system in terms of which e-gold 
account holders can spend specified weights of gold to other e-gold account holders.103 
Consequently, e-gold can only be traded with someone with another e-gold account. 
Only ownership is exchanged. The e-gold system is created to suit international 
transactions considering the fact that it is borderless in nature. Traders using this system 
can trade this currency with other persons in several other countries. Although the term 
e-gold is the most common, other electronic metals (e-metals) such as e-silver, e-
palladium and e-platinum are also used in a similar fashion.104 
There are several reasons why a cyberlaunderer would thrive on this system. 
Firstly, it is not regulated. Unlike what is required of financial institutions, no CTRs are 
filed out. The customer due diligence (CDD) standards which most financial institutions 
are obliged to comply with are circumvented. Also, the recurring issue of anonymity 
comes up again. The fact that one’s account can only be accessed via the internet 
renders it impossible for the identity of e-gold traders to be verified. Another reason 
                                                            
101 Financial Action Task Force (2006: 12). 
102 See <http://www.e-gold.com/unsecure/qanda.html> [accessed on 14 July 2010]. 
103 See <http://www.e-gold.com/unsecure/qanda.html> [accessed on 14 July 2010]. 
104 See <http://www.e-gold.com/unsecure/qanda.html> [accessed on 14 July 2010]. 
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why this system appears attractive is that most corporations of this nature are inclined to 
play on the vulnerability of nations with little or no effective AML regime. It is no 
wonder that e-gold Ltd has its server in Luxemburg.105 This method of cyberlaundering 
is very relevant to the placement, layering and integration stages of money laundering. 
As indicated earlier, this is a non-bank peer-to-peer issuer model,106 and the problems 
identified with this model are part of the general problems of online payment systems. 
 
3.4.5.1 Digital payment systems: A hypothetical scenario 
A brief account of how it is possible for a cyberlaunderer to launder money using 
this method is briefly explained below: 
Mr Brice is a drug dealer who leaves in Cambodia. He has acquired incredibly 
huge proceeds of about $1 million from his illicit activities within the past 3 
months. He finds it very risky to deposit this money directly into his account in 
B Bank. He therefore goes online (www.e-gold.com) and opens an account with 
e-gold Ltd. He uses his entire illicit proceeds to acquire $1 million worth of e-
gold (placement). Mr Brice spends this much because he realises that he can 
easily dispense with the CTR requirements of most financial institutions. With 
this done, he begins to make numerous purchases of assets online from various 
companies situated in Australia and New Zealand, which accept e-gold as a 
                                                            
105 See Phil Osborne’s quoted commentary in Kellerman (2004: 4). 
106 See paragraph 3.2.3.3 supra. 
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viable payment system (layering).107 Note: Mr Brice could, alternatively, have 
more than one e-gold account to which he could deposit parts of the illegal 
proceeds in feigning legitimacy. 
 
3.4.6 Virtual communities 
 The subject of cyberlaundering would not be completely explored without a concise 
insight into virtual communities, as this is one of the most problematic techniques of 
cyberlaundering. A virtual community (otherwise called Massively Multiplayer Online 
Role-Playing Games or “MMORPG” in short) is an internet-based game/social network 
which allows participants or players to live a life very much akin to everyday life on 
such a website. The virtual world or community is a part of the online community in the 
form of a computer-based simulated environment.108 The virtual community enable its 
users, who are represented in the form of avatars,109 to live another life in a virtual 
environment that completely mirrors real life. This is currently the trendiest version of 
online gaming. There are several examples of virtual communities, such as Second Life, 
Entropia Universe, IMVU, Active Worlds, World of Warcraft and Kaneva. In 2008, it 
was estimated that the size of an average virtual economy grew to about $450 million 
from $350 million in 2007.110 The current size of Second Life’s virtual economy stands 
                                                            
107 This example is a real-life account of cyberlaundering involving e-gold Ltd. See Grow (2006: 10) and 
Kellerman (2004: 16). 
108 For more details see <http:www.en.wikipedia.org/wilg/virtual-world/> [accessed on 22 July 2010]. 
109 An avatar is a digital representation of a person on the web. In simple terms, it means the “cartoonized” 
version of a person in a virtual environment. 
110 See Drug Enforcement Administration (2007) “National Money laundering Strategy” 
<http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/docs/nmls.pdf>  [accessed on 29 July 2010].  
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well above $500 million.111 Given the popularity of Second Life, which has about 18 
million users,112 it would be discussed as a sample case. 
 In 2003, Second Life (SL) was developed by Linden Labs in the United States. In this 
virtual world, users (who are called “residents”, and through their avatars) can ‘explore, 
meet other residents, socialize, participate in individual and group activities; create and 
trade virtual property and services with one another or travel throughout the world.’113 
The residents in SL also have the ability to create things (or virtual objects) in the virtual 
world. SL has its own currency called Linden Dollars (L$) which residents spend for 
commerce and other purposes. Residents can make real profits from their inworld 
transactions. Although residents receive a weekly stipend of L$300, they are not 
restricted to this amount because a resident can convert real money into L$ using SL’s 
money exchange service called “Xstreet,” which operates like a money exchange service 
in the real world.  
 It is very hard to classify virtual communities as game sites because these 
communities transcend the virtual world into real life, resulting in dire consequences 
which take a heavy toll on the real world. At this juncture, one might ask, how can a 
virtual reality site like SL be used for cyberlaundering? There are several reasons for 
this. 
 
 
                                                            
111 See Drug Enforcement Administration (2007) “National Money laundering Strategy” 
<http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/docs/nmls.pdf>  [accessed on 29 July 2010].  
112 See <http:www.en.wikipedia.org/wilg/virtual-world/> [accessed on 22 July 2010]. 
113 See Jamali (2009: 32). 
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3.4.6.1 Reasons why SL can be used for money laundering 
 
(i.) SL is a world with very little regulations or laws that control individual 
relations.  Consequently, there are no AML laws. It is therefore the most 
conducive environment for money launderers. Where a society exists 
which does not prescribe laws controlling money laundering, such an act 
would not be deemed a crime and consequently, there can be no 
“criminals” in this respect. Even though SL has laws which govern the 
activities of residents by way of its Terms of Service provisions, this, 
however, only pertains to the residents’ protection from harassment, 
disclosure, indecency, intolerance and assault.114  
Also, SL’s economy is not as controlled as in the real world, even though 
it operates like the one in the real world. For example, the Linden 
Exchange Service (Xstreet) enables residents to change real money to L$ 
for use in SL. Also, L$ can be changed back to real money to be used in 
the real world. The catch here is that Xstreet, not being a real financial 
institution, is not under any obligation to comply with the reporting 
obligations, nor is it required to provide information about clients as is 
expected from real-life traditional financial institutions.115 
 
(ii.) SL is also a haven for tax evaders. The tax implication for residents in SL 
is a very dicey one. The principle followed is this: Only residents who 
                                                            
114 See <http://www.secondlife.com/terms_of_service/> [accessed on 22 July 2010]. Also see Jamali 
(2009: 41). 
115 The few regulatory mechanisms put in place by SL are considered in paragraph 4.5.3.1 below. 
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live in the European Union are charged value added tax (VAT). This is 
chargeable for anything for which a resident pays Linden Lab.116 
However, VAT is not charged on transactions in Linden Dollars (L$) 
between residents. The real risk it creates with respect to tax evasion, and 
consequently cyberlaundering, is that the resident-to-resident transactions 
are not subject to taxation, and residents are under no obligation to 
disclose their source of income. Therefore, criminals can hide their 
income from the tax authorities by transacting in different forms of goods 
and services in the virtual world.117 
  
(iii.) Also, SL forms a perfect environment for smurfing. There are certain 
features which are very ideal for smurfing activities. A simple example is 
where an army of smurfs (living in different regions of the world) 
purchase L$ as residents in SL. They can each trade with themselves or 
do whatever they wish with the money.118  At the end of the process, a 
smurf can convert the proceeds of his or her trade back from L$ to his/her 
local currency. At this stage, the proceeds appear legitimate, and 
anything can be done with the money. 
 
(iv.) Further, SL thrives on anonymity. The notion of a “resident” in SL is 
itself very vague. All that fellow residents in the virtual community know 
                                                            
116 This includes premium account registration, purchases from the land store, land use fees (tier), private 
region fees, land auctions and LindeX transactions. See <http:www.secondlife.com/corporate/vat.php> 
[accessed on 23 July 2010]. 
117 Jamali (2009: 45). 
118 Jamali (2009: 45). 
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about each other are each other’s names, and a bit of each other’s profile. 
Therefore, the resident could be anybody, and the details given in the 
profile do not necessarily have to be correct, as it is nearly impossible to 
conduct a verification of a resident’s true identity on SL. Identity theft 
could easily occur in such an environment. Also, the dangers of online 
banking, as earlier identified,119 gets compounded even more in SL 
because a resident can open a legitimate account in a “virtual bank,” 
without providing a correct identification. Given that the basic banking 
laws that apply in the real world are nearly non-existent in SL, this opens 
up opportunities for money laundering, with devastating consequences 
for the real-life economy. 
 
 
3.4.6.2 Second Life: A hypothetical scenario 
 In Second Life (SL), as well as in other virtual communities, there are complex sets 
of circumstances illustrating how money can be laundered. A basic example is the 
following: 
 Mr Brice is a drug dealer living in South Africa. He wishes to convert the 
proceeds of his illegal activities to legitimate wealth. He becomes a 
resident of SL. He buys land in SL, and builds a big entertainment 
company which provides all forms of social activities such as night clubs, 
strip clubs and an exclusive 5 star club, membership of which is strictly 
                                                            
119 See paragraph 3.4.2 supra. 
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by invitation. Mr Adams is a smurf, along with about 50 others who live 
across parts of Asia, South America, Europe and Africa. They are also 
residents of SL. Mr Brice loads different smart cards with equal financial 
value with the proceeds of his illegal activities. He sends those cards 
electronically to the various smurfs. On SL, Mr Brice invites the smurfs 
to be the only exclusive members of his 5-star club. The membership fee 
he charges is equivalent to the value represented in each smart card, 
which is paid to him in L$. Mr Brice could automatically convert this 
back to real money or could further trade with the other smurfs with these 
proceeds. Mr Brice can redeem these proceeds using the ATM machine, 
either in form of a credit to his credit card account or his PayPal account. 
Note: The possibilities are boundless, given the infinite complex 
scenarios imaginable with regard to SL. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
44 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
REGULATING CYBERLAUNDERRING: POSSIBILITIES AND 
PRACTICALITIES 
 
4.1 GENERAL 
 At this stage, it should be quite clear that the concept of cyberlaundering, because of 
its novelty, is not properly mapped out and does not have well defined elements. 
Although the general notion is still the fact that cyberlaundering is an internet-based 
form of money laundering, its parameters are not as yet defined. It becomes extremely 
difficult for one to distinguish properly and set out effective control mechanisms for the 
crime. As a result, a piecemeal approach needs to be followed in exploring and 
identifying ways to fill up the loopholes that exist in cyberspace which enable criminals 
to thrive on cyberlaundering. 
 The current anti-money laundering (AML) regime is primarily based on enforcement 
mechanisms against money laundering operations. This follows the order of listing the 
predicate crimes that form the basis of money laundering; investigations, prosecutions, 
trials, convictions, punishment and confiscation.120 While preventive mechanisms exist 
in certain instances,121 the enforcement strategies, however, remain central to the AML 
regime. It is from this premise that the ensuing discussion regarding the AML regime on 
cyberlaundering sets out. 
 
                                                            
120 Marshall et al (2005: 5). 
121 This basically entails reporting, regulations and supervisions, including ensuring customer due 
diligence. See Marshall et al (2005: 7). 
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4.2 CURRENT AML MEARSURES AND CYBERLAUNDERING 
 The general preventive AML measures can be quickly summarised as follows: We 
have the reporting provisions on the one hand, and the record-keeping provisions on the 
other.122 The model legislation which has been generally followed is the Bank Secrecy 
Act, which requires financial institutions to report all transactions above the value of 
$10, 000, and which also requires financial institutions to maintain records of all 
transactions for a period of five years after such transaction has been concluded. 123 
Similarly, most telecommunication services and internet service providers (ISPs) are 
required to observe and maintain user data for a period of one year in order to assist law 
enforcement bodies with investigations and prosecutions of cyber-related crimes.124  
 Whilst these reporting and recording requirements are more suited for certain 
tangible or physical transactions, they are not entirely viable solutions to the problem of 
cyberlaundering. The cyberlaundering dilemma scales past these measures. The 
following are reasons for this fact. 
 Firstly, by virtue of the nature of online transactions, one need not be physically 
present at the relevant place or site where transactions are conducted. This strikes at the 
problem of anonymity. The problem here is not whether certain ISPs, including some 
online financial institutions, can adhere to these reporting and record-keeping 
requirements, but the viability or truth of the information provided by the customer or 
                                                            
122 Many local laws have followed the trend set by the Bank Secrecy Act. 
123 See sections 101 to 113 of the Act. 
124See Jamali (2009: 67). The following local enactments are clear examples of this position: The US 
Telecommunications Act 56 of 1996, U.S.C. (sections 706-709); the South African Electronic 
Telecommunications Act 103 of 2006 (sections 3 and 4); and with regard to the European Council, the EC 
Directive 2002/22/EC (adopted on 7 March 2002) bears relevance. 
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user, which they (as ISPs) might be required to keep or report. This appears to be a 
common feature of most of the cyberlaundering mechanisms identified earlier.125 For 
this reason, it is also problematic to enforce the “Know Your Customer” (KYC) 
principle directly.126 
 Secondly, the internet totally alleviates “the process chain” of things. Time and space 
as we conceive of them are shrunk into an immeasurable unit due to the speed at which 
the internet operates. The result is that it is highly unlikely (especially for hackers) to 
leave a trail behind, evidencing certain online transactions. The intangible nature of the 
internet makes it extremely easy for internet users to bypass certain processes or steps in 
a transaction process, which would otherwise be required ordinarily.127 Closer 
monitoring by law enforcement agencies becomes very difficult as a result. In addition, 
one must remember that there are millions of transactions conducted per second on the 
internet. This creates some technical difficulty with respect to maintaining and closely 
scrutinizing each transaction.128 Also, the internet is constantly exposed to different 
threats of viruses with very destructive capabilities. These viruses range from those 
which are designed to steal data, to others which are designed to hide or conceal data in 
other to render it inaccessible. Certain viruses also have the capability of shutting down 
websites completely.129  
                                                            
125 See paragraph 3.4 supra. 
126 See a discussion on this at 4.5.1.1 below. 
127 For example, when one is opening a bank account at a physical bank, there is what is initially called 
the verification stage where one shows the consultant one’s identity book and other relevant documents in 
other to ascertain that the documents presented match the person in question. This verification process is 
not the same when one needs to open an account online. As stated earlier in paragraph 3.4.2 supra, the risk 
that inheres  is that the information which is provided by the person wishing to open an account need not 
be true, in order for an online account to be open. 
128 See Jamali (2009: 50). 
129A new breed of Trojan viruses known as the MX Trojans has these capability. 
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 Given all these dangers that result of the nature and numerous features of the internet, 
it becomes extremely difficult to effectively apply the reporting and record keeping 
requirements as a preventive solution to cyberlaundering. 
 
4.3 EFFORTS BY ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AGENCIES 
 With respect to the general AML regime, there are several enforcement measures 
which have been put in place by certain agencies and institutions to fight money 
laundering. Given that cyberlaundering has not been really put into perspective, the 
general AML regime does not have measures that specifically deal with the issue of 
cyberlaundering. Nevertheless, some governmental agencies and financial organisations 
have adopted measures which are geared towards fighting cyberlaundering. This section 
gives a broad overview of these governmental agencies and financial organisations, and 
how they are responding to the emergence of cyberlaundering. 
 
4.3.1 Governmental agencies 
4.3.1.1 The Drug Enforcement Administration 
 The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) was established by the United States 
(US) government to control the sale and distribution of illegal drugs in the US.130 Illicit 
drug trade has been a steadily growing business globally. Recent studies have shown 
                                                            
130 The DEA has an international reach with about 86 offices in over 62 countries. 
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that about $65 billion are being spent on illegal drugs annually in the US alone.131 For 
this reason, the DEA has been very active in the enforcement of money laundering laws 
in the US, as it is the key prosecutorial agency for drug related crimes in the country.132 
 In a recent report, the DEA identified New York City as one of the main financial 
hubs in the US where the threat of cyberlaundering operations relating to the proceeds of 
illegal drugs is menacing.133 One of the DEA’s focus areas is the e-payment system.134 
Nowadays, hard cash is hardly used to pay for drugs. Payments are now done online. To 
come to grips with this phenomenon, the DEA manages a special unit called the 
National Drug Intelligence Centre (NDIC) which is tasked with uncovering this 
practice.135  
 The DEA has examined the scenario where a law enforcement officer catches a drug 
dealer who has certain smart cards or pre-paid cards in his or her possession. In this 
regard, the question that arises is whether the seizure of the pre-paid cards consequently 
hinders the business of the suspect in custody. This would not be an issue where law 
enforcement bodies seize hard cash proceeds of crime. The NDIC arm of the DEA has 
been looking into this, and the outcome of the first investigation it has conducted shows 
that it is futile to stop electronic payments by seizing pre-paid cards. This is because pre-
paid cards can be accessed by both the card holder and other third parties who are 
usually linked to the card. Thus, the funds that are stored in a pre-paid card, which might 
be in the possession of a law enforcement officer, can still be transferred from that card 
                                                            
131 See <http://www.justice.gov/dea/programs/money.html>  [accessed on 30 July 2010]. 
132See Jamali (2009: 42). 
133 See <http://www.justice.gov/dea/programs/money.html>  [accessed on 30 July 2010]. 
134 See paragraph 3.2 above. 
135 See <http://www.justice.gov/dea/programs/money.html>  [accessed on 30 July 2010]. 
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by the same suspect once released on bail, or by a co-conspirator or third party who 
need not be physically in the presence of the accused.136 
 For a problem of this nature, the only likely remedy would be a legislative one. The 
State of Nevada is the only state in the US with a possible solution to the problem. In 
Nevada, a new law was enacted called the SB-82,137  which came into effect on 1 July 
2009. This law authorizes law enforcement officers to investigate suspicious pre-paid 
card transactions and fraud cases that occur each year. Thus, with a warrant, the relevant 
authority can freeze funds on the pre-paid card for up to 10 days. This inevitably 
prevents criminals, as well as third parties, from removing the funds from the pre-paid 
card within that period. In certain instances, the SB-82 allows authorities to seize funds 
loaded onto a pre-paid card without a warrant.138 
 Whether or not this solution has been viable has not been assessed yet. We shall 
revert to the SB-82 in the discussion on pre-paid cards below.139 For now, in sum, credit 
is due to the DEA for inspiring this legislative initiative. 
 
4.3.1.2 The Federal Bureau of Investigation 
 The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is a multi-tasked law enforcement agency 
in the US. It is a special intelligence unit for certain high profile crimes, including 
money laundering. 
                                                            
136 Such third parties or co-conspirators are mostly smurfs who are not usually in the same territory or 
country as the accused. See the National Drug Intelligence Program (2010: 55). 
137 NV Senate Bill 82-75th (BDR 14-266). 
138 See the National Drug Intelligence Program (2010: 61). 
139See paragraph 4.5.2.1 below. 
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 However, with regard to cyberlaundering, the FBI currently works in conjunction 
with other agencies like the Internet Fraud Complaint Centre (IFCC) and the National 
White Collar Crime Centre (NWC3). The FBI has not published a concrete report on its 
various investigatory surveys on cyberlaundering, neither has it published a report on 
cyberlaundering cases. But on a much broader note, it has identified the online casinos 
as a major hub for money laundering activities.140 
 
4.3.1.3 National Accountability Bureau 
 The National Accountability Bureau (NAB) of Pakistan is the country’s own 
initiative to fight the rampant incidence of corruption and money laundering in the 
country.141 The cash flow in Pakistan is largely unregulated. A clear example of this is 
the country’s currency exchange services which use the banking remittance system.142 
The growth of technology in Pakistan has compounded these problems. It has therefore 
turned out to be a hot spot for cyberlaundering operations.  
 In a factual sense, the NAB has not been entirely successful in combating the 
numerous cyberlaundering activities in the country. This is due to the problematic 
financial system in the country. Pakistan was previously blacklisted by the Financial 
Action Task Force (FATF) as a Non-Compliant Country and Territory (NCCT),143 
                                                            
140 International Finance Corporation (2009: 3). Also see Jamali (2009: 41). 
141 The agency was established in terms of the National Accountability Ordinance 1999. See 
<http:www.nab.gov.pk/> [accessed on 08 August 2010]. 
142 Jamali (2009: 43). The remittance system allows for less scrutiny of persons seeking to exchange 
currencies regardless of such person’s nationality and the amount he wishes to change.  
143 See <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/info/191432/>  [accessed on 08 August 2010]. 
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because it was seen as a risk to the ‘international financial system.’144 Although the 
NAB lays out plans to tackle the ‘electronic money laundering problem,’145 as it calls it, 
there has not been any enforcement or any actual step taken towards this end.  
 
4.3.1.4 Serious Organized Crime Agency 
 The Serious Organized Crime Agency (SOCA) is the United Kingdom’s incentive to 
effect a proper regulation of illegal drugs, human trafficking, fraud, gun crimes, 
computer crimes and money laundering.146 With regard to anti-money laundering 
activities, the SOCA deals primarily with suspicious activity reports, and acts in 
accordance with the Proceeds of Crime Act147 and the Computer Misuse Act.148  
 Similar to the FBI, the SOCA is yet to issue a concrete report on its numerous 
investigations of cyberlaundering activities in the United Kingdom. 
 
4.3.1.5 Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
 The Immigration and Customer Enforcement (ICE) is an investigative agency in the 
US Department of Homeland Security. As part of its vast array of programmes, the ICE 
seeks to prevent and investigate criminal operations along the US border. This 
inevitably includes money laundering.  
                                                            
144 See <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/03343/html>  [accessed on 08 August 2010]. 
145 See <http://www.nab.gov.pk/> [accessed on 08 August 2010]. 
146 See <http://www.soca.gov.uk/about-soca/>  [accessed on 08 August 2010]. 
147 2002, c.29. 
148 1990, c.18. Whilst the Proceeds of Crime Act deals with aspects of civil recovery of criminal proceeds, 
the Computer Misuse Act deals with basic violations of computer technology laws. 
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 Recently, the ICE’s cybercrime centre established the Operation Cornerstone 
Investigation initiative.149 This initiative has the primary purpose of attacking the roots 
of money laundering activities, including cyberlaundering, by enlisting the cooperation 
of the private sector. Just like the DEA, the ICE has also identified the e-payment 
systems as being problematic. Its own strategy is more holistic in nature. The ICE has 
delegated special agents to liaise with certain private sectors, mostly financial 
institutions, in order to assist it in identifying weaknesses in the financial system. By 
identifying these weaknesses, it would be much easier to find an effective and practical 
solution. Currently, in each of the ICE’s 25 different field offices across the US, a 
special agent has been appointed to exercise this function.150 
 
4.3.2 Financial Agencies 
4.3.2.1 The Financial Action Task Force 
 The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an inter-governmental agency which was 
established by the G-7 summit in Paris in 1989. It plays a policy-making role in the fight 
against money laundering. Primarily, the FATF ‘sets international standards to combat 
money laundering and terrorist financing; it assesses and monitors compliance with the 
FATF standards; it conducts typologies studies of money laundering and terrorist 
financing methods; trends and techniques, and responds to new and emerging threats 
such as proliferation financing.’151 The FATF’s “40 plus 9 Recommendations”152 are a 
                                                            
149 Kellerman (2004: 3). 
150 Kellerman (2004: 4). 
151 See <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/info/191432/>  [accessed on 08 August 2010]. 
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clear reflection of its aims. Other than the basic formulation of these policies, the FATF 
also seeks to stir up political will amongst countries to make the fight against money 
laundering their top priority. As of March 2010, the FATF had about 35 member 
states.153 
 The FATF has played a big role in the fight against cyberlaundering because it has 
identified certain key threat areas. In 2007, the FATF identified certain new (online) 
payment methods which make the electronic cash system a potential threat to the fight 
against money laundering.154 Sadly, this prediction by the FATF is now a reality. The 
FATF has also identified and issued a report on the aspect of online gambling.155 Certain 
of its proposals in this regard are considered below.156 
 Furthermore, the FATF Special Recommendation VII157 (SR VII) seeks to prevent 
money laundering and terrorist financing possibilities by way of wire transfers. In this 
light, the FATF has proposed that the originator information should be made available to 
the relevant law enforcement or prosecutorial body in order to aid investigations and 
prosecutions. The originator information would also help financial intelligence units and 
the beneficiary financial institution to identify and report these suspicious transactions 
and their existent risks.158 
                                                                                                                                                                              
152 Financial Action Task Force (2003: 78). 
153 See <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/info/191432/>  [accessed on 08 August 2010]. 
154 Financial Action Task Force (2010C: 56). Also, see paragraph 3.2 supra. 
155 Financial Action Task Force (2008: 77). See annexure. 
156 See paragraph 4.5.3.2 below. 
157 Financial Action Task Force (2003: 23). Also see the Financial Action Task Force (2004B: 31).  
158 Financial Action Task Force (2004B: 14).  
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 The FATF generally stresses the importance of political will in the fight against 
money laundering. The enforcement of these FATF recommendations and proposals by 
countries is equally crucial. 
  
4.3.2.2 The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network 
 The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) is a law enforcement branch 
of the US Department of Treasury. It was established in 1990 to provide a broader 
government-based form of financial intelligence. The FinCEN is directly responsible for 
the regulatory measures flowing from the Bank Secrecy Act. Thus, the FinCEN oversees 
the reporting and recoding keeping stipulations required by most financial institutions in 
the US.159 In essence, this agency seeks to enforce the control measures currently in 
place to curb money laundering activities. Also, the Uniting and Strengthening America 
by Providing Appropriate Tools Required To Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 
2001 (US PATRIOT Act)160 widened the duties of the FinCEN to include terrorist 
financing initiatives related to money laundering activities. 
 Ultimately, the FinCEN seeks to cover all money laundering threats, which includes 
the detection and deterrence of cyberlaundering.161 This is stated in its Strategic Plan for 
the Fiscal Years of 2008-2012.162 However, the FinCEN is yet to issue an actual report 
on the subject. 
 
                                                            
159 <http://www.fincen.gov/about_fincen/wwd/>  [accessed on 9 August 2010]. 
160 115 Stat. 272 (2001). 
161 See Jamali (2009: 59). 
162 Available at <http://www.fincen.gov/about_fincen/wwd/>  [accessed on 9 August 2010]. 
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4.3.2.3 The World Bank 
 The World Bank’s effort to regulate cyberlaundering is probably the most radical and 
aggressive compared to most other regulatory or policy-making organizations. The 
World Bank’s fight against cyberlaundering is premised on the rationale that the 
internet, which is the very root of the problem, should be used to fight the crime. 
 The World Bank, in conjunction with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), has 
introduced the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAPs),163 which is geared 
towards blocking certain loopholes in the cyber payment systems, especially with 
respect to the Non-Bank Issuer Model and the Peer-to-Peer Model.164 The threats that 
emanate from these payment methods are identified as a result. However, there is yet to 
be a report issued on this. 
 Also, the World Bank has started a project called the Global Systems Mapping 
Project, which monitors the flow or movement of money in complex financial 
systems.165 By identifying the various avenues or means through which money moves, it 
would be much easier for governments and policy makers to be able to forge better 
monetary policies in future.166 
 Furthermore, the World Bank proposes that a cyber-threat analysis centre should be 
created across all financial institutions. These threat centres could be like an 
international information sharing vehicle. Some financial institutions in the US already 
have this facility, generally called the Financial Services Information Sharing and 
                                                            
163 See <http://www.imf.org/about/projects/worldbank>  [accessed on 13 August 2010]. 
164 See the discussion at paragraph 3.2.3.3. supra. Also, see Kellerman (2004: 3).  
165 Kellerman (2004: 16). 
166 Kellerman (2004: 16). 
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Analysis Centre (ISAC). The ISAC serves as an internet-based third party service 
provider which could provide alerts, and real time information sharing and 
notifications.167 Along with detecting potential cyberlaundering transactions, the ISACs 
could detect other possible cyber threats like phishing.168 
 Moreover, better harmonisation and coordination of cyber entities would go a long 
way in curbing cyberlaundering. Ensuring a tighter entry barrier, such as licensing and 
registration, would further prevent certain websites such as e-gold.com (and the like) 
from being mechanisms for money laundering.169 
 Another proposal made by the World Bank relates to the 13th recommendation by the 
FATF, which deals with the Know Your Customer (KYC) principle. Basically, financial 
institutions are required to apply this principle as closely as they can to online 
transactions with customers. This is discussed in detail below.170 
 Lastly, it is suggested that electronic forensics should be promoted and given priority 
in financial institutions today.171 In order for bank examiners and law enforcement 
agencies to investigate cyberlaundering operations, there must first be electronic 
evidence with which they can work.172 However, electronic evidence would only exist if 
it is properly preserved by the financial institution. Therefore, in-house or external 
training of financial officers must be conducted in order to preserve the evidence 
effectively. 
                                                            
167 Kellerman (2004: 18). 
168 Phishing is a form of identity theft in terms of which a criminal tries to acquire someone’s details (like 
username, password, and credit card information) by masquerading as a legitimate entity.  
169 Kellerman (2004: 16). 
170 See paragraph 4.5.1.1 below. 
171 Kellerman (2004: 17). 
172 Kellerman (2004: 16). 
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4.4 GENERAL PREVENTIVE MEASURES FOR CYBERLAUNDERING 
 General preventive measures can be taken to tackle cyberlaundering. One must not 
stray from the fact that the problematic aspects of cyberlaundering are invariably linked 
to the general problems identified within the broad sphere of money laundering.  
 Firstly, a primary area of focus should be countries which the FATF has removed 
from its list of Non-Compliant Countries and Territories (NCCTs), but are now 
subjected to close monitoring.173 Although delisted, many of these countries still do not 
adequately police internet operations. They are thus fertile breeding grounds for 
cyberlaundering activities. This has a dire consequence on countries with effective AML 
regimes, because criminals who run internet sites in these former NCCTs are often not 
located in such countries. They are often located in fully compliant countries such as the 
United States and the United Kingdom. Consequently, these NCCTs are merely a tool or 
base point for the operations of a criminal, because of the lack of vigilant policing. 
 Another area of focus should be predicate offences. A crime must have been 
committed from which a criminal derives funds. The purpose of laundering the funds is 
eventually to disguise the proceeds of such crime in order to make them appear legal.  
This is the underlying rationale for money laundering. Just as there are predicate 
offences underlying the typical money laundering offence like theft and fraud, there are 
also predicate offences which are the basis of cyberlaundering. Some of these predicate 
offences are internet fraud, identity theft, internet piracy, and phishing, amongst a host 
                                                            
173 Some of these countries are, namely, Cook Islands, The Dominican Republic, Angola, Antigua, Egypt, 
Grenada, Pakistan, Guatemala, Indonesia, Marshall Islands, Myanmar, Nauru, Nigeria, Niue, Philippines, 
Russia, St. Vincent, the Grenadines and Ukraine. See <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/info/191432/> [accessed 
on 08 August 2010]. 
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of others. The logic is simply that by tackling these predicate crimes one is ripping out 
the roots of cyberlaundering. The effective combating of these predicate crimes depends 
on whether efficient policies exist to suppress them adequately. 
 
4.5 SPECIFIC PREVENTIVE MEASURES: CHOKE POINTS OF 
CYBERLAUNDERING 
 Other than the general measures stated above, there are also specific deterrent 
measures that merit our focus. At this stage, it is important to reaffirm the fact that 
anonymity is the core of the cyberlaundering dilemma. Unfortunately, one cannot 
merely tackle the anonymity problem holistically. Rather, one must consider the most 
plausible regulatory means available for the core areas which stem from the anonymity 
feature. The identifiable areas, or choke points, are online banking, cyber payment 
systems and e-gaming. Regulatory possibilities for these various aspects are expounded 
upon below. 
 
4.5.1 Safeguarding online banking 
4.5.1.1 Modifying the KYC principle 
 The FATF recommendation 13 simply states that all financial institutions must have 
basic knowledge of their transacting customers.174 In recent times, this principle has 
                                                            
174 Financial Action Task Force (2003: 62). 
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been further expounded by the Wolfsberg group of banks.175 The financial institutions 
under the Wolfsberg group advocate what is known as the risk-based approach.176 
However, the KYC principle and its extended risk-based form are only preconditions 
laid down for a financial institution wishing to transact with a “new” customer. Seeing 
that the customer would be continually present, the same procedure is not usually 
conducted for future transactions. This precautionary framework does not cater directly 
for online transactions. As mentioned earlier, with respect to one of the problems with 
online banking, multiple actors can have access to an online bank account, as long as the 
information required for access is provided. The problem here is that there is currently 
no effective mechanism which can ascertain the true identity of the person seeking to 
open an account online. Hence, the same rigid KYC safeguards that would have been 
conducted for potential customers in the normal course of events cannot be similarly 
performed with respect to a prospective customer of an online bank. 
 The Electronic Banking Group of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has 
been battling with the quandary of how banks can apply the due diligence requirements, 
basically the KYC principle, to non-face-to-face customers. In its 2001 report on risk 
management principles,177 the Committee proposed that banks should apply the same 
customer identification procedures to non-face-to-face customers as is done in the case 
of face-to-face customers who are subjected to an interview. Coupled with this, financial 
institutions are advised to mitigate higher risks by ensuring the ‘certification of 
documents presented; requisition of additional documents to complement those which 
                                                            
175 See the Wolfsberg Group of Banks (2010: 40). 
176 The risk-based approach requires banks to look at the inherent risks involved in banking with a 
customer. This entails a more detailed analysis of the customers, their background and their respective 
personal circumstances. 
177 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2001: 90). 
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are required for face-to-face transactions; independent contact with the customer of the 
bank; third party introduction, e.g. by an introducer [subject to any criteria] or requiring 
the first payment to be carried out through an account in the customer’s name with 
another bank subject to similar customer due diligence standards.’178 
 Even though the above measures are quite stringent, the problem is yet unsolved. For 
this reason, it would seem logical to require a potential customer who wishes to open an 
online account at a bank to be physically present in order to go through the normal 
interview process. In other words, subjecting a potential customer to the same face-to-
face interview procedure might be the safest route to follow. After this process, such a 
customer can conduct subsequent banking transactions online. By so doing, the bank can 
conduct the necessary verifications and thus act in line with the required KYC principle. 
However, this would not completely eradicate the problem. For the other numerous 
transactions to be conducted subsequently online by the customer, better safeguards 
need to be adopted. To this end, a more complex system of identification needs to be 
introduced which would not merely require one to populate the required field in the 
application form with a name and password. In this regard, it has been suggested that in 
order to promote transparency of online transactions, a biometric and public key 
infrastructure must be installed.179 This implies that one would always need to provide 
two kinds of information. Firstly, specific information about something which the 
customer knows, and second, some personal feature of his or her person would need to 
                                                            
178 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2001: 81). 
179 Kellerman, (2004: 16). 
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be authenticated.180 What this exactly entails remains uncertain at this point. But 
adopting such a dual standard verification system is likely to guarantee the identity of 
persons who perform online transactions. 
 
4.5.1.2 Adopting new wire transfer models 
 By way of rehashing what has been discussed earlier,181 the notion of wire transfers 
refers to the electronic transfer of funds, albeit its value, at the request of a customer 
from one bank account to a beneficiary account, which is usually another bank. The 
Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) system is the 
main interbank messaging system which banks use to indicate monetary transfers 
internationally.182 However, the loophole that exists relates to the wire transfers between 
a local bank and an international bank, with no relationship or connection with each 
other. The quote below details the vulnerability of the SWIFT system which criminals 
have since exploited. 
‘When a bank wants to wire a customer’s money to another bank, one of the 
several types of SWIFT messages may be used as instructions for the transfer. 
This message is sent through SWIFT separately from the actual settlement of 
the funds. When a customer’s bank does not have a direct relationship with the 
ultimate receiving bank [especially with international transfers] banks may use 
either cover payments or serial payments to send money through one or more 
                                                            
180 Kellerman, (2004: 16). This biometric system is currently used when one needs to draw money from an 
ATM machine, which requires the ATM card and a password. It is difficult to follow the same safeguard 
with regards to online transactions. Clearly, this aspect is one which merits some technological 
advancement. This should however not defy the reach of the modern world’s technological prowess. 
181 See paragraph 2.3 supra. 
182 See paragraph 2.3.1 supra. 
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intermediate banks. [In terms of cover payments]... two separate SWIFT 
messages [the MT103 and the MT 202] are sent... The MT 202 sent to the 
intermediary bank did not retain originator and beneficiary information [as the 
MT 103].183  
 In essence, a criminal has been able to disguise his or her identity in order to launder 
money by sending wire transfers through intermediary banks.184 The upshot of this is 
that these intermediary banks are oblivious about the identity of the sender. The DEA 
has been effective in identifying this problem. As a result, a new type of SWIFT 
messaging system known as the MT 202 COV has been introduced.185 The MT 202 
COV covers the loopholes and enables the intermediary bank to retain both originator 
and beneficiary information on virtually all wire transfers. Therefore, it does not matter 
whether the intermediary bank is local or international, for the information is captured 
regardless of the link it might have with the originator bank. As a result of this new 
system, an intermediary bank can consequently conduct its own investigations on 
suspicious transactions as it would have had the requisite information to do so.186 
 While some financial institutions in the US are beginning to adopt this new system, 
most financial institutions are yet to adopt it fully. The banking regulatory laws 
therefore need to be amended to ensure that this new wire transfers system is made 
mandatory for all banks.  
 
                                                            
183 The National Drug Intelligence Program (2010: 79). 
184 See paragraph 3.4.2.1 supra. 
185 The National Intelligence Program (which the DEA oversees) has been instrumental in this innovation. 
The system was launched on 21 November 2010.  
186 The National Drug Intelligence Program (2010: 79). 
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4.5.2 Tighter measures for cyber payment systems 
4.5.2.1 Smart cards regulation 
 As a basis, it must be generally understood that most payments are made online 
through prepaid or smart cards.187 The main issue that has been identified in this respect 
is that cyberlaunderers are using smart cards to store and transfer proceeds of illicit 
activities. The focus should therefore be on how the use of these smart cards can be 
regulated by the relevant authorities. We have seen above that the DEA has influenced 
the State of Nevada to adopt the SB-82 law, which would enable law enforcement 
authorities to investigate suspicious smart card transactions and freeze the stored value 
in these cards when a criminal is caught with them.188 Governments should therefore 
take a cue from this by enacting similar legislation. This initiative might, however, be an 
up-hill battle for most countries which have been delisted from the NCCTs list, but are 
still subject to monitoring by the FATF. This is evidenced by the fact that majority of 
these countries are still battling to comply with certain basic FATF recommendations. 
 Furthermore, given the fact that certain smart card companies, like the Freedom 
Eagle Card,189 do not put a cap on the amount that can be loaded onto their cards, smart 
cards should be regulated by limiting their functions and capacities.190 This can be done 
by restricting the value in a smart card to a particular amount, by restricting its turnover 
limits and by limiting the number of smart cards per customer.191 Although this might 
                                                            
187 See the discussion on cyber payments in paragraph 3.2.2 supra.  
188 See paragraph 4.3.2.3 supra. 
189 See paragraph 3.2.2.1 supra. Also see <http://www.freedom-card.co.uk/> [accessed on 2 September 
2010]. 
190 See Ping (2004: 15) for a similar argument. 
191 Ping (2004: 16). 
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seem quite probable in lieu of regulation, such measures can still be circumvented in a 
world of smurfs. A cyberlaunderer could still easily use smurfs who individually have 
smart cards in their own names for his or her operations. Moreover, this is likely to 
cause an uproar amongst smart card companies who might see this as an obstacle to 
doing good business. 
 
4.5.2.2 Protected cryptography 
 Messages (and other forms of communications via the internet) are not barely 
conveyed or “transported” around cyberspace. They take the form of encryptions. To 
understanding how encryptions work, one invariably needs to delve into the roots and 
skeletal framework of online transactions, which is embedded in a technological mould. 
Certain suspicious communications between persons can go unchecked. An example is 
where a cyberlaunderer sends an encrypted code to a smurf via an email containing the 
details of certain prepaid cards.192 Encryption is a technological term used to refer to a 
protected message. To get a clearer picture of how this works, when two persons 
communicate via the internet (from simple emails to online bank transactions) there are 
two public keys involved.193 In a much broader sense, each communication (or “key”) is 
encrypted. However, in certain instances, and largely dependent on the government of 
                                                            
192 See the concurrent privacy argument below in paragraph 4.6.2 below. 
193 For more information on what a public key entail see <http://www.livinginternet.org/file_crypt>  
[accessed on 16 August 2010]. 
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the day, a “third party system” generally known as a key recovery system194 is in place 
to intercept public keys and decrypt the relevant information that transpires.  
 In the US, the National Security Agency came up with what is known as “Clipper 
Chip” which is a key recovery system. This is a standard encryption method that would 
enable the government to track encryptions. Once a suspicious transaction is sensed, the 
government can decrypt messages in order to have a trail of the message. Where a 
“Clipper Chip” kind of system is not in place, a law enforcement agency would require a 
court order to decrypt such a message when there is sufficient proof of suspicious 
transactions occurring. However, this raises privacy concerns.195 The information 
technology (IT) body in a country should have such a key recovery system. 
Unfortunately, for most countries that do have it, this key recovery system has been 
under utilized. 
 
4.5.2.3 Better detection mechanisms 
 With respect to cyber payments, the issue of detection is crucial. The question that 
begs an answer is how law enforcement bodies are expected to detect suspicious 
transactions. Most electronic transactions possess certain digital signatures which entail 
‘the identification of the user, location of the teller machine where it was used with the 
amount of transaction it holds, and the date/time stamp.’196 It is usually a hassle for 
                                                            
194 See <http://www.livinginternet.org/file_crypt> [accessed on 16 August 2010]. The key recovery 
system is also known as the key escrow agency system. See Straub (2002: 531). 
195 See paragraph 4.6.2 below. 
196 See Jamali (2009: 43). 
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authorities to monitor every digital signature closely for suspicious transactions. For this 
reason, oversights often occur. 
 Most financial institutions and companies are now taking cognisance of the detection 
problem. Some pre-paid card companies now use the services of some independent 
detection agencies to monitor the pre-paid card transactions by their customers. An 
example of such a company is Red Plc which offers the PRISM Merchant system197  and 
which boasts successful detection of fraud and money laundering schemes. PRISM’s 
operations are explained as follows: 
‘PRISM Merchant combines powerful neural network risk models with a flexible 
rules-based system for implementing expert merchant risk management strategies. 
PRISM’s neural models utilize data feeds from your merchant processing system 
to score transactions from individual merchants. The models take into account a 
wide range of merchant information, including higher than normal incidence of 
charge-backs, variations in transaction volumes, numerous same-card 
transactions, average ticket amounts that exceed the norm for the merchant’s line 
of business, large number of keyed-in transactions and significant increases in 
average ticket items for a credit sale.’198 
 
The success of this system is yet to be ascertained. The mere fact that the 
detection of cyberlaundering activities is put in the hands of private entities is just 
another way of privatizing national security. This should not cause one to lose sight 
of the fact that law enforcement bodies bear the principal duty of detecting such 
                                                            
197 For more information  see <http://www.redplc.com/about/>  [accessed on 16 August 2010]. 
198 <http://www.redplc.com/about/PRISM/> [accessed on 16 August 2010].   
 
 
 
 
67 
 
 
 
suspicious transactions. Thus, it is nothing more than a reiteration of the fact that the 
bulk of the work rests with governments. 
 
4.5.3 Blocking the lacunae in e-gaming 
4.5.3.1 Regulation and virtual communities 
 Virtual communities, as identified earlier,199 are very problematic. Perhaps the most 
problematic features are the possibilities for participants to open a bank account in a 
“virtual bank” and transfer money within the virtual world as in the real world. For this 
reason, these virtual worlds are very attractive to the prying eyes of money launderers. 
One does not have to look into space to find the loophole, because internal control might 
seem to be the only viable solution. Some of these internal measures deserve some 
elaboration. 
 The most glaring problem which needs redress is the unregulated banking system in 
the virtual worlds. These so-called “virtual banks” should be made subject to the same 
regulations and control to which terrestrial banks are being subjected. It could, however, 
be quite challenging in reality to expect virtual banks to adhere to record-keeping and 
reporting requirements.200 But an attempt would undeniably be the first step in 
addressing this vulnerability.  Most virtual communities are now under pressure to 
operate their business in line with the standards of the real world. For example, in March 
2009, Entropia Universe obtained permission from the Swedish Financial Authority to 
                                                            
199See paragraph 3.4.6 supra.  
200 This links back to the discussion on the intangibility of the internet, which aids cyberlaundering. See 
paragraph 4.2 supra. 
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conduct legitimate banking activities in its virtual community.201 This has the 
implication that Entropia’s virtual bank would be subject to the same recording-keeping 
and reporting requirements which terrestrial banks must comply with. Other virtual 
communities like Second Life (SL) are yet to obtain such a license. If these licenses are 
made mandatory for virtual communities, and they follow suit, the threats posed by 
virtual banks would be lessened. 
 SL does, however, have regulatory measures aimed at policing suspicious 
transactions in its virtual world. For instance, because most of the activities on its site 
are, in reality, based on its server, it is able to monitor the activities of each resident 
closely and keep a record of them. SL is also under an obligation to report to law 
enforcement agencies where suspicious transactions have been detected.202 SL’s money 
exchange service (X-street) is similarly monitored. However, the reality is that these 
measures are still constantly circumvented by residents. For this purpose, a third party 
regulatory body is required to keep a better watch. 
  
4.5.3.2 Regulation and online gambling 
 Online casinos are invariably informal financial organizations and they should be 
subject to the same strict regulatory measures as online banking.203 In consequence, 
online casinos should be subject to the KYC principle. Such strict measures might, 
                                                            
201 See Mindark (2009: 4). 
202 Jamali (2009: 48). 
203 See paragraph 4.5.1 supra. 
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however, not be pleasing to operators of online gambling sites, as it could dissuade 
potential customers.  
 As indicated earlier,204 the online gambling problem is compounded by the fact that 
most sites are registered in off shore countries with very weak AML laws.205 As a result, 
the KYC procedures are not adhered to assiduously. This factor, by itself, hinders the 
possibility of finding an appropriate measure to control money laundering through 
online gambling. 
 Due to imminent dangers, the US has gone as far as banning online gambling (albeit 
only in certain respects). With some pressure from the FBI, in 2007, Linden Labs took 
an unprecedented step by banning online gambling in Second Life.206 Banning online 
gambling completely might well be the last available solution, should the situation spiral 
out of control. 
 
4.6 PROSECUTING CYBERLAUNDERING 
4.6.1 General 
 In general, the prosecution of the crime of money laundering has been quite 
challenging. The problem of jurisdiction and investigations often arises. These problems 
are compounded further when it comes to cyberlaundering. There has been no reported 
case law on cyberlaundering. This aspect, much like the other aspects of 
                                                            
204 See paragraph 3.4.4 supra. 
205 For example, Antigua is a territory where most online casinos sites are registered.  
206 This was done in terms of the Illegal Gambling Business Act 15 of 1970, U.S.C. and the Unlawful 
Internet Gambling Enforcement Act 4 of 2006, U.S.C. See Jamali (2009: 42). 
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cyberlaundering, is an untrodden path, which leaves one in the dark. One ought to 
remember that the cyberlaunderer could well be anybody, ranging from the criminal 
who siphons off funds from the crime he commits into cyberspace, to a juristic person or 
an internet service provider (ISP). The question as to whom to prosecute would depend 
solely on the merits of each case.   What appears to be a bigger challenge, however, are 
the issues of privacy and jurisdiction. More light will be shed on these aspects. 
 
4.6.2 Privacy concerns 
 The right to privacy is a fundamental human right guaranteed in the constitutions of 
most democratic states. An ongoing debate has been whether the right law enforcement 
agencies have to pry into electronic communications of persons should supersede the 
individual’s fundamental right to privacy. Undoubtedly, this is a major stumbling block 
for law enforcement officers when conducting investigations on suspicious transactions. 
This debate is particularly heated when it comes to the issue of cryptography. Many 
have argued that the key recovery system, which is like an “automatic store-house” 
where all encryptions are collected, is a direct violation of one’s privacy.207 This is 
because a law enforcement agency can easily gain access to such encryptions where 
they are able to prove a reasonable suspicion or make out a prima facie case. Consent by 
persons cannot play a role here because it involves prove of encryptions, and not hard 
files or records containing the identity of individuals.208 
                                                            
207 See Straub (2002: 530). 
208 See <http:// www.livinginternet.org/file_crypt>  [accessed on 16 August 2010]. 
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 The opposing argument here relates to national security and the interest of justice. 
There are many evil-minded people, such as terrorists, who constantly devise means of 
causing some kind of havoc. There are others who find the internet simply more 
convenient for committing all soughts of crimes, and these people use the internet 
concurrently as a useful tool to “wash” the proceeds derived from their respective 
crimes. The question is thus whether the need to prevent the activities of these persons is 
more fundamental than the need to protect an individual’s right to privacy.    
 To start with, every case must be judged on its own merits. Despite these arguments, 
it should be remembered that the domestic legislation dealing with electronic 
communications in the relevant country must first be studied. Some of these laws 
stipulate the situations where a law enforcement agency is allowed to access the 
electronic records and communications of persons. For example, in South Africa, the 
Electronic Communications and Transactions Act209 (ECTA) lists instances where 
electronic communications may be intercepted.210 A similar provision can be found in 
the Regulation of the Interception of Communication and the Provision of Related-
Information Act211 (RICA). Similarly, in the US, the Right to Financial Privacy Act212 
(RFPA) and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act213 (ECPA) both regulate the 
interception of the one’s personal information. The RFPA specifically requires a law 
enforcement agency to have authorization before the financial records of a person can be 
                                                            
209 Act 25 of 2002. 
210 See sections 51 and 52 of the Act. 
211 Act 70 of 2002. See sections 2 to 11. 
212 Act 12 of 1982, U.S.C. Sections 3401-3409. 
213 Act 18 of 1986, U.S.C. Section 2510(12). 
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obtained from a financial institution. The ECPA, on the other hand, prohibits internet 
service providers from dispensing the details of one’s electronic communications.214 
 Therefore, as long as a particular action by a law enforcement agency is warranted – 
that is, where reasonable suspicion has been established, the privacy argument might not 
hold. On the other hand, where no reasonable suspicion exists, a law enforcement 
agency cannot go sniffing around one’s private communications and successfully raise 
the interest of justice argument in defence. 
 
4.6.3 The question of jurisdiction 
 The question of jurisdiction arises at the stage where a cyberlaunderer is 
apprehended. There is a need to ascertain where such criminal should be prosecuted. 
This yields several complications, considering the nature of cyberlaundering. Where a 
criminal operates a website to conduct his activities, it is uncertain whether jurisdiction 
would be established in the territory from which the suspect operates, or at the place 
where the website is registered, or the place where the conduct of the criminal is felt. 
Due to the novel nature of the cyberlaundering concept, it is yet to be adequately 
classified both, under international law and municipal law. Once this is settled, the 
relevant laws would have solved the riddle of jurisdiction. 
 Cyberlaundering falls under the category of cybercrimes, and for this reason, one 
must have recourse to cyber law as a starting point to determine jurisdiction. In South 
                                                            
214See sections 3401-3409 of the RFPA and sections 2510(12) of the ECPA.  
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Africa, for example, section 90 of the ECT Act215 provides that a South African court 
would have jurisdiction over the prescribed cyber offences stipulated in the Act in terms 
of the territoriality principle, the effects principle, or the active personality principle. 
The ECT Act is a good example because it represents a blend of both UK and US 
legislations on cyber law. 
  In terms of the active personality principle, a person who has committed a 
cybercrime would be prosecuted in the country of which he is a national. In the case of 
cyberlaundering, it is likely that the criminal would be concurrently charged with the 
predicate offence which he committed. Since it is very difficult to physically apprehend 
a cyberlaunderer, the active personality principle might not be entirely suited for 
cyberlaundering purposes. 
  In terms of the effects principle, the effects of the crime must have been felt in the 
country seeking jurisdiction. However, with this principle, it is difficult to establish the 
actual effect in question because of the volatile nature of cyberlaundering.  For example, 
in light of the typical online gambling scenario where a criminal uses smurfs to play on 
his online casino, the smurfs could play on such website from different countries around 
the world. It is almost inconceivable to determine the actual effect of such an operation. 
 The territoriality principle, therefore, merits consideration. According to this 
principle, the court will exercise jurisdiction where the offence is committed within the 
territory of the country seeking jurisdiction. One has to conceive of internet service 
providers as businesses. Just as a company’s registered place of business is the place 
                                                            
215 See footnote 209 supra. 
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where a summons is served on it in a pending criminal matter, the same principle should 
apply to websites. Thus, the place where a website is registered should be indicative of 
where jurisdiction lies in a cyberlaundering case. 
 The European Union Convention on Cybercrimes216 also supports the territoriality 
principle with respect to other cybercrimes. In terms of the Convention’s provisions, 
states parties must prosecute cyber offences in the light of either the territoriality 
principle or the active personality principle. 
 Therefore, a cyberlaunderer should be deemed to have committed the crime in the 
territory where the website he uses as a medium is duly registered. This is, however, not 
without challenges, especially in countries that are notorious for their poor AML laws. 
There are numerous websites which are not registered, and which freely operate in these 
countries. And as these activities go unchecked, cyberlaundering operations are easily 
fostered. 
 Overall, international instruments and national laws should be adapted to suit the 
cyberlaundering scenario. Where cyberlaundering is properly classified and framed, the 
question of jurisdiction would be properly defined and put in a better perspective. 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
216 Budapest. 23.XI.2001. Adopted on 12 April 2001, and came into effect on 1 July 2004. 
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CHAPTER 5 
EVALUATION 
 
5.1 THE PRESENT: AN OVERVIEW 
 The subject of cyberlaundering has sadly been constantly evaded.217 This is probably 
due to its hybrid character, being a crossroad between law and technology. The aura of 
vagueness and uncertainty around it does not make it any easier to fit in a particular 
mould. Given the convolutedness of the problem, as set out above, this paper has sought 
to unveil the phenomenon of cyberlaundering. This is important because, by identifying 
and understanding the concept of cyberlaundering and how it operates, one takes the 
first step towards unravelling the problem. Although possible control mechanisms have 
been identified, these are merely tentative. By way of contrast, what is not at all 
tentative is the reality of cyberlaundering and its growing prevalence. 
 In truth, the gravity of this problem cannot be quantified because of the nature of the 
internet. The much reiterated feature of anonymity, which forms the root of the various 
choke points identified, makes it seem as though mere mortals are battling ghosts in the 
crusade against cyberlaundering. Ironically, because the internet defies the notion of 
boundaries and jurisdictions, it is extremely difficult to establish jurisdiction over the 
                                                            
217 The fact that not much is known about cyberlaundering is the primary reason why the topic has 
constantly been avoided. For example, in July 2009, the House of Lords European Union Select 
Committee issued a report titled “Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism” 
<http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committee-archives/ >  [accessed on 5 September 2010], 
yet nowhere does it deal with the issue of cyberlaundering, which is known to be a principal medium to 
fund terrorism. 
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crime. Even where jurisdiction can be established,218 one might still need to answer 
some other burning legal questions such as those pertaining to privacy.  
 The impact of cyberlaundering is becoming increasingly evident in the world today. 
Probably the most glaring of these effects is the fact that the economies of many 
underdeveloped countries are being crippled by it.219 Also, from the different scenarios 
of cyberlaundering that have been discussed, it is clear that cyberlaundering is not 
always an end in itself, but could be a means to an end. Terrorism could be one of such 
aims, and because cyberlaundering ties in with terrorist financing, it greases the wheels 
of terrorist activities.220  
 
5.2 THE FUTURE: A PROGNOSTIC SURVEY 
 Technology is certainly not static. As a result of the advent of cyberlaundering and 
the lessons it teaches, one cannot look forward to new technological advancements 
without harbouring fears of the loopholes that could further exist for criminal 
enterprises. This section portends briefly what the future holds for technology, as it 
concerns cyberlaundering. 
 With respect to online gaming, the different forms existent now are a far cry of what 
is yet to come. A few years back, when scientists spoke about the concept of virtual 
communities, it seemed as though one were reading a fictional movie script like Star 
Wars to a lay audience. But today, it is a reality. Virtual communities are gaining 
                                                            
218 See the theories discussed above in Chapter 4, paragraph 4.6.3. 
219 See Chapter 1, paragraph 1.2 for an elaborate discussion. 
220 This opinion is shared by the Financial Action Task Force. See Financial Action Task Force (2010A: 
15). 
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popularity by the second, and the traditional (non-internet) form of gaming221 is already 
old-fashioned in our internet-based world. The predominant gaming companies which 
have not been offering a virtual community-type game such as PlayStation and Xbox 
360 are reportedly going to incorporate virtual communities-type games into their game 
packages.222 And what would this mean for cyberlaundering? If the existing loopholes 
earlier identified in virtual communities223 are not fixed, criminals would have a field-
day using virtual communities as an avenue to further wicked schemes. Not only is the 
number of participants in the virtual community growing,224 but also, the addiction to 
this form of gaming is spawning unprecedented vices.225 
 Mobile phones are also being used increasingly to effect electronic payments. 
Although present statistics show that mobile phones are more efficient for micro-
payments226 rather than macro-payments,227 the latter payment form is generally more 
suited for cyberlaundering. One must not underestimate the potential of cell-phone 
transactions for money laundering. Having high-tech smart phones (like the iPhone and 
the BlackBerry), with phenomenal internet browsing features, many can actually access 
the internet from their cell phones without necessarily sitting in front of a computer. As 
                                                            
221 This would include PC-type games, PlayStations 1 and 2, and Xbox 360. 
222 PlayStation is already incorporating a PlayStation 3 Home feature (which is its own virtual 
community) in every Play Station 3 console. See Wong (2010: 1). 
223 See paragraph 3.4.6 supra. 
224 Currently, a combined total of 80 million gamers are registered with all the existing virtual 
communities, and this figure is set to triple to a whopping 240 million by 2015. See Wong (2010: 2). 
225 Recently, a competitor on one of these virtual communities (Legend of Mir 3) killed a co-competitor in 
real life for stealing a “cyber sword” which he had won in a contest. See Wong (2010: 1). 
226 Micro-payments are transactions involving a very small amount of money. PayPal defines micro-
payments as transactions involving payments below $12. See <http://www.paypal.com/info/micro-
payments/> [accessed on 5 September 2010]. 
227 A macro-payment system is the opposite of a micro-payment system, because it involves large 
amounts of money. What constitutes a large amount of money is a question of fact which will be entirely 
dependent on the nature of the relevant transaction. Going by the definition given by PayPal (footnote 
219), this would be transactions exceeding $12. 
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 Should the flaws identified with smart cards go unchecked, the proliferation of smart 
card usage would mean an increased possibility of cyberlaundering operations. This 
does not portend well for the future. 
 
5.3 RECOMMENDATIONS 
 Having discussed some of the aspects of cyberlaundering, including their 
ramifications, it is submitted that the following recommendations merit consideration: 
 
5.3.1 Bringing cyberlaundering to the centre stage 
 The concept of money laundering is constantly evolving. What one might have 
understood as money laundering in the past decades is not necessarily the case today. 
Money laundering at present wears the cloak of cyberlaundering. The general myth that 
criminals are always one step ahead of the law finds a home in the concept of 
cyberlaundering. Therefore cyberlaundering should be the focal point of researchers, 
law makers, law enforcement agencies and governments in general and in tandem. This 
also implies that there is a need to expand the focus of the traditional concept of money 
laundering, to include cyberlaundering. This would help to give the issue more currency. 
As a consequence, law makers would for once be steps ahead of the criminal. 
 It is therefore recommended that money laundering, internet and cyber crime laws be 
amended to expressly accommodate the new phenomenon of cyberlaundering. In order 
to foster this expectation, awareness campaigns need to be conducted to educate the 
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responsible authorities as to its prevalence. Given the hybrid nature of cyberlaundering, 
further research on it should be encouraged both in the fields of law and computer 
science. With continuous research on the subject, new possibilities would be uncovered 
for dealing with the problem. 
 
5.3.2 Better policing 
The subject of cyberlaundering is one which requires very careful attention. 
Specialised agencies, some of which might be known as cyber crime units, must pay 
better attention to cyberlaundering operations. Possible detection mechanisms can only 
be discovered with continuous research on the subject, which would aid the relevant 
enforcement agencies. Also, a government’s information technology (IT) body, which 
also conducts internet supervision, must be on constant alert. These IT institutions must 
work closely with enforcement agencies for possible detection of cyberlaundering 
operations. In this regard, a recent innovation known as semantic technology should be 
used when conducting investigations. The semantic technology can ‘automatically 
identify companies based on language grammar and rules, tag and store relationships 
such as links, as well as other relations like family relationships, roles and positions and 
monies or assets.’232 In essence, money launderers with shell companies on the internet 
can be exposed easily with this system. 
 Another crucial area that can only be tackled with the cooperation of IT institutions is 
the entry barrier system for future internet service providers (ISPs). By sifting through 
                                                            
232 See Mulukutla and Ruegg (2009: 80) for more details. 
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the viability of these ISPs, a risk management system is conducted. This exercise would 
be particularly necessary for informal financial service providers like E-gold Ltd 
(www.e-gold.com).233 Informal money transmitters can be scrutinized by subjecting 
them to licensing and registration. With such entry barriers in place, it would be easy to 
fish out non-registered websites. A non-registered website is a salient characteristic of a 
website that is operated for money laundering purposes. Most online gambling sites fit 
tightly in this frame.234 
 However, law enforcement agencies are not the only bodies concerned here. The 
required intervention also involves financial institutions and electronic card companies, 
which must give full and unflinching cooperation to the law enforcement agencies by 
reporting suspicious transactions and fraudulent misuse of smart cards.235 
 
5.3.3 Extending the term of the FATF beyond 2012 
 The FATF has undoubtedly played a phenomenal role in shaping the current anti-
money laundering law (AML) regime.236 The FATF has also helped blaze the trail with 
regard to cyberlaundering by giving early indications of threat areas like online 
gambling.237 The FATF is, however, not a permanently structured body. In 2004, when 
                                                            
233 See the discussion in paragraph 3.4.5 supra. 
234 See paragraph 3.4.4 supra. 
235 In practice this might be easier said than done. This is because most smart card companies (just like 
other profit-oriented companies) are gain driven. These companies are mostly not welcoming of law 
enforcement agencies snooping around their business.  They might get the impression that third parties 
might think their business is tainted with illegality. One can allay these fears by enacting laws that would 
strictly make these companies file suspicious transaction reports.  
236 See paragraph 4.3.2.1 supra. 
237 Financial Action Task Force (2010B: 66). Also see the Financial Action Task Force (2008: 59). See 
annexure. 
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the original mandate of the FATF expired, it was again extended to August 2012.238 As 
part of its renewed mandate, the FATF has undertaken to conduct typological exercises 
which would highlight new threat areas of money laundering.239 Its 2008 report on 
online gambling is proof of this.240  
 The FATF would certainly need more time to delve into the issue of cyberlaundering. 
It has little time left to conduct the kind of field work which is required for the problem. 
Considering the fact that the FATF reports are highly valuable and its recommendations 
are authoritative, the same weight would be attached to future reports it might issue on 
cyberlaundering. One harbours the fear that if the FATF’s mandate is not extended 
beyond August 2012, eventual development in the field of anti-cyberlaundering law 
would be greatly hindered. Conversely, with increasing fears of the dangers posed by 
new techniques of cyberlaundering, there might be sufficient reasons to give the FATF 
more time to deal with the situation effectively. 
 
5.4 CONCLUSION 
 In the 1920s, French writer Marcel Labordere said that ‘man will never be able to 
know what money is no more than he will be able to know what God is... [M]oney is not 
the infinite but the indefinite, an astounding complex of all sorts of psychological as 
well as material reactions.’241 Money is thus a sociological phenomenon which shapes 
                                                            
238 See Financial Action Task Force (2004A: 10). One cannot undermine the value of the FATF. In 
retrospect, the FATF principles and recommendations are now popularly accepted soft law, and have now 
become the skeletal framework upon which most domestic money laundering legislations are based. 
239 See paragraph 9, Financial Action Task Force (2004A: 13). 
240 Financial Action Task Force (2008: 30). See annexure. 
241 Pollitzer (2001: 1). Also see Presley (1979: 809). 
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human behaviour. Invariably, an understanding of this phenomenon equates to an 
understanding of a particular form of human behaviour. The study of money laundering 
fits within this framework. Human greed and the insatiable depths of the human mind 
represent the philosophical and sociological explanation for the problem of money 
laundering. This same explanation holds for the concept of cyberlaundering, even 
though it appears as another level of money laundering. The evil of cyberlaundering is 
just another representation of the fact that malignity inheres in the human mind’s stream 
of consciousness.242 
 Thus, if this paper serves an ultimate purpose, it would be to cause a rude awakening, 
because the journey has only just begun. One cannot afford to lag behind one bit, or be 
deterred by the many complexities and tangled knots of cyberlaundering. If the right 
guards are put up in the necessary areas, and with the exercise of due vigilance, this 
problem would certainly not be insurmountable. 
 
[Word count: 20, 976] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
242 This fact is reminiscent of an observation made by the 14th century writer, William Shakespeare, that 
‘the evil that men do lives after them; the good is oft interred within their bones’. Shakespeare (1994: 42). 
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ANNEXURE 
THE FATF 2008 REPORT ON CASINOS 
 
The essential threats arising from online casinos in comparison to traditional casinos 
are elucidated in the FATF 2008 Report on Casinos.243 
 
107. Internet casinos may wish to check customer location because of the additional 
risks arising from transnational operations.  
 
Transaction risk  
 
109. Casinos should consider operational aspects (i.e. products, services, games, and 
accounts/account activities) that can be used to facilitate money laundering and terrorist 
financing activities. In addition, land-based and Internet casinos have the following 
potential transaction risks:  
 
 Proceeds of crime. However money is transferred to a casino, there is a risk that 
this money will have arisen from illegal activities such as check fraud, credit/debit card 
fraud, narcotics trafficking, theft from employer. Paying greater attention to high 
spenders/rollers will be helpful in mitigating this risk.  
  
                                                            
243 FATF Report on Casinos (2008) <http:www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/5/61/41584370.pdf> [accessed on 
25 July 2010]. 
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 Cash. Customers may use a land-based casino to exchange large amounts of 
illicit proceeds denominated in small bills for larger ones that are easier to hide or 
transport. Also, certain cash deposits by a customer, especially cash deposits which are 
considered relatively large either in relation to i) a particular casino’s average receipts, 
or ii) what is known about a customer’s financial status.  
The majority of payments to Internet casinos are made directly from financial institution 
accounts. However, Internet casinos can operate as part of mixed gambling chains which 
also include betting shops and/or land-based casinos. It may be possible for customers to 
provide land-based outlets with cash which can then be credited to Internet casino 
accounts. Internet casinos should work closely with their land-based counterparts that 
initially receive the cash to ensure that CDD measures are applied, including verifying 
that the depositor is the account holder, and when appropriate, benefit is secured from 
the personal contact between land-based casino staff and customers.  
 
Transfers between customers 
 
If Internet casinos wish to allow inter- account transfers between their customers they 
should devise careful policies and procedures which monitor the amount of the 
transfer(s). Internet casinos may also be aware of customers transferring money between 
themselves more informally without using their casino accounts, which should be taken 
into consideration in the casino operator's risk assessments.  
Land-based casinos may also be aware of customers borrowing money from non-
conventional sources, including other customers. Informal money lending can be illegal, 
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and it can also offer criminals an opportunity to introduce proceeds of crime, usually 
cash, into the legitimate financial system through the casino. Again, this can pose a 
heightened risk.  
Loan Sharking (also known as usury). Casinos in some countries have a problem with 
this activity which is a crime that involves loaning money to individuals at an interest 
rate that is above a maximum legal rate, sometimes collected under threat of violence. 
Loan sharks may be financed  
 
 
 
and supported by organized crime networks. A loan shark usually preys on individuals 
who are struggling financially or, for some reason, are unwilling to seek credit from 
legal sources.  
 
• Use of casino deposit accounts. Casinos will wish to encourage their customers to only 
use their deposit accounts for gambling purposes. Casinos need to consider what 
constitutes an abuse of such an account and should have policies, procedures, and 
internal controls, to prevent customers from using such accounts to deposit and 
withdraw without gambling or minimal play.  
 
• Redemption of Chips, Tickets or Tokens for Currency. Casinos in some countries do 
not require that customers provide identification for the redemption of chips, tickets, or 
tokens unless it triggers government reporting thresholds. For a customer that has an 
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established casino account number,8 a casino, which is not required by governmental 
regulations to record such transactions at the cage, nonetheless should have policies, 
procedures, and internal controls to identify large redemptions9 to such a customer that 
were paid with currency10 (including any large cash outs without gambling for large 
denomination bills), or through issuance of a cheque.  
 
 
110. There are a number of specific transaction issues which apply to Internet casinos 
(including “mobile casinos”):  
 Multiple casino accounts or casino wallets.  
An internet operator may own and control multiple web sites. Single web sites can also 
offer a range of different types of gambling. Operators will need to monitor customers' 
aggregate position across the whole of their casino business.  
Customers may wish to separate the different types of gambling they are conducting 
with the same operator, or through the same web site, for legitimate reasons, e.g. to 
monitor their performance in different areas. Casinos should implement procedures and 
systems to assist in the identification of customers opening multiple accounts or wallets 
for dishonest or inappropriate reasons, including attempting to obscure their spending 
levels, or to avoid checks undertaken at a threshold level.  
Changes to financial institution accounts. Casino customers commonly use their 
accounts with financial institutions to gamble over the internet. Customers may hold a 
number of financial institution accounts, and they may wish to change which of these 
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accounts they use in the casino. Casinos may wish to consider updating customer due 
diligence following such changes.  
. Identity fraud. Details of financial institution accounts may be stolen and used on 
web sites. Stolen identities may also be successfully used to open financial 
institutions accounts, and such accounts may also be used on web sites. Internet 
Provider (IP) Number checks are useful in preventing criminals from opening 
multiple casino accounts using stolen identities, using the same computer. Casinos 
will be aware of these risks because of the 'charge back' system. Internet casinos also 
have a responsibility to protect their customers from having their identities stolen 
when using their web site, and will therefore wish to provide adequate security.  
. Pre paid cards. Using cash to fund a pre-paid card poses similar risks as cash. 
Casinos cannot make the same level of cross reference checks on some types of pre 
paid cards as they are able to perform on financial institution accounts.  
. Electronic wallets (e- wallets). Not all e-wallets are licensed in reputable 
countries, and a number of e-wallets accept cash as deposits. However, e-wallets 
which only accept money from financial institution accounts in the customer's name 
will not usually pose any greater or lesser money laundering risk than if funds are 
received directly from the financial institution. However Internet casinos should be 
aware that when customers make payments into e-wallets from their financial 
institution accounts, the statements issued by their financial institutions may only 
record the payment to the e-wallet, not the transaction to the Internet casino. This 
may be useful for dishonest customers who wish to disguise their gambling. (See 
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paragraph below regarding the related issue of casinos purposefully obscuring 
payments made to financial institution accounts held by customers).  
. Games involving multiple operators. Poker games often take place on platforms 
(i.e. a central computer system that links electronic gambling devices for purposes of 
game selection, operation, monitoring, security, and auditing) shared by a number of 
different casino operators. The platform is likely to play a key role in monitoring the 
pattern and value of play for potential money laundering activities, e.g. chip 
dumping. The operator and the platform should have clear policies in respect to 
respective roles, alerts, enquiries, and subsequent actions, for AML/CFT.  
 
121. Internet casinos may adopt specific methods of customer’s identification. The 
FATF Recommendations recognise that non face to face business relationships or 
transactions can carry specific risks.17 For that reason non face to face business requires 
alternative or additional compliance methods, especially in the area of CDD. These 
methods may rely upon new technologies, including the deposit and withdrawal 
methods offered on the website, and checks on the customer’s IP address.  
 
122. In the majority of cases Internet casinos do not meet their clients, except perhaps 
their high spenders. Internet casinos are therefore usually unable to form social 
relationships with them, or to form judgements as a result of those relationships. They 
are also unable to verify customer's physical appearance against photographic 
identification documents.  
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123. If casinos use software systems to assist with CDD the software should access a 
range of positive and negative checks. Although not available in all countries, public 
source data can be particularly valuable in identifying PEP’s and individuals subject to 
various sanctions, as well as identifying associations with organised crime and/or 
terrorist financing activities. In addition, casinos may wish to do Internet searches in an 
effort to obtain additional information about a customer (see also paragraph 138 below).  
 
 
124. If basic database checks are not sufficient, perhaps because of a raised risk level, 
Internet casinos can use a variety of other checks: i) traditional checks using customer's 
personal and official documents; ii) checks on customers' source of funds;18 iii) using 
direct contact via telephone or email, using personal or electronic means.  
 
128. With regard to Internet casinos, checks may be made on the location of the 
computer used when casino accounts are opened, or during gambling, including IP 
checks19. IP addresses provide information about the country where the computer being 
used is located.  
 
 
129. It may be helpful to cross reference IP number information about jurisdiction with 
i) personal data provided by the player and the data provider by the Internet service 
provider; ii) the information the customer provides about their postal address and iii) if 
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payment is made to the casino from a financial institution account, the country where 
the financial institution account is held, which may be ascertainable from a BIN check.  
 
 
130. Internet casinos are dependent upon IT systems. These IT systems should be 
adapted to ensure accurate monitoring of accounts and customers, and to ensure that 
adequate records are kept and retained. Decisions may need to be made about the 
necessary level of details of the transaction records which are retained. A risk based 
approach cannot solely rely upon IT, there must also be an element of human 
supervision and staff levels should be proportionate to risk levels.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
